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Once dominated by threats from nation-states, the current global scenario is 
dominated by a fast shift of powers that present us an intricate interaction 
between multiple actors, where faceless, unknown enemies, once well 
known to us, is currently dominated by well-organised, well-prepared 
terrorist groups.  
Hezbollah is recognised as one of the most capable terrorist groups with an 
extensive network outside Lebanon dedicated to drug, weapons and human 
trafficking, as well as money laundering to finance terrorism, posing as a 
vast source of security instability.  
As a State instrument, the Intelligence services hold the ability to be on the 
frontline of preventing and combating terrorism. Nonetheless, to 
comprehend this phenomenon it is necessary to analyse the actors of this 
menace.  
In light of this conjuncture, this dissertation is divided in three main chapters 
aiming to answer the following key issues: What is terrorism? How does a 
transnational terrorist group function? Do the Portuguese intelligence 
services have the necessary tools to prevent and combat transnational 
these threats? 
Key words 




Outrora dominado por ameaças provenientes de Estados-nação, o cenário 
global actual, dominado por uma rápida mudança de poderes que nos 
apresenta uma interacção complexa entre múltiplos actores, onde inimigos 
desconhecidos, anteriormente bem identificados, é actualmente controlado 
por grupos terroristas bem preparados e bem organizados.  
Hezbollah é reconhecido como um dos grupos terroristas mais capazes, 
com uma extensa rede fora do Líbano dedicada a tráfico de droga, armas e 
seres humanos, tal como o branqueamento de capitais para financiar o 
terrorismo, representando um grande foco de instabilidade à segurança. 
 Como instrumento de Estado, os serviços de informações detêm a 
capacidade de estar na linha da frente na prevenção e combate ao 
terrorismo. Todavia, para compreender este fenómeno é necessário 
analisar os actores desta ameaça.  
À luz desta conjuntura, esta dissertação está dividida em três capítulos 
principais que visam responder às seguintes questões fundamentais: O que 
é o terrorismo? Como opera um grupo terrorista transnacional? Será que os 
serviços de informações têm as ferramentas necessárias para prevenir e 
combater estas ameaças? 
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Amal Movement: Afwaj al Muqawamah al Lubnaniyyah, Shia Muslim militia 
formed c. 1975. 
 
Ayatollah: Highest hierarchal title for the Twelver Shia, used as a title of 
respect especially for one who is not an imam title in the religious hierarchy 
achieved by scholars who have demonstrated highly advanced knowledge 
of Islamic law and religion. 
 
Jihad: holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; also a 
personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline 
 
Sheik: Arab chief/a leader of a Muslim group 
 
Shia: the Muslims of the branch of Islam comprising sects believing in Ali 
and the Imams as the only rightful successors of Muhammad and 
disregards the three caliphs who succeeded him. 
 
SIED: Defence and Strategic Intelligence Service 
 
SIRP: Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic 
 
SIS: Intelligence Security Service 
  
Sunni: the Muslims of the branch of Islam that adheres to the orthodox 
tradition and acknowledges the first four caliphs as rightful successors of 
Muhammad 
Ulama: From the ʿulamāʾ, who are versed theoretically and practically in the 
Muslim sciences, come the religious teachers of the Islamic community—
theologians (mutakallimun), canon lawyers (muftis), judges (qadis), 
professors—and high state religious officials like the shaikh al-Islām. In a 
narrower sense, ʿulamāʾ may refer to a council of learned men holding 




Following a phase of numerous ideas, debates and considerations, the 
approach of this topic was born envisioning several factors. Therefore, to 
carry on this dissertation, the subsequent methodology was applied: 
This research includes data collected from a diverse, national and 
international expert literature, as well as open sources. 
In terms of literature, we focused on a vast collection with predominance on 
Security, Intelligence, Law, International Relations and Political Science 
subjects. On the open sources, the selection of legal documents available at 
the official government websites, such as the Ministry of Internal 
Administration, Intelligence and Security Service, some articles from 
prestigious Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Media was 
preferred.      
Subsequently we synthesized, organised, in a coherent form, and analysed 
it in a light of the questions that we will attempt to answer during this 
exercise.   
In terms of referencing, by norm, it is preferable to use the Portuguese NP 
405 bibliography system in this faculty. Nonetheless, since the selected 





With the end of the Cold War and the ‘Iron Curtain’, we watched an end of 
an era, the era of a bipolar world. A divided world was crumbling under the 
pressure between two superpowers, the United States of America and the 
USSR.  
The shift of powers, because of the end of the Cold War, introduced us to a 
conjuncture of nationalist, ethnical matters, plus organised crime and 
terrorism. Ideology of that period was an essential pillar to define a certain 
type of terrorism, terrorist groups whiling to survive initiated a hazardous 
association with organised crime, converting international terrorism to 
transnational terrorism.  
A new set of threats began, as well as a new configuration of power, where 
interdependence and cooperation are key elements, sovereignty along with 
security cannot be analysed as before. We cannot simply analyse a country, 
in this case in terms of security, excluding it from an international 
community, particularly with the conjuncture of blurred borders and a 
faceless, unknown enemy.  
These enemies, once well known to us, currently do not have a flag (or the 
opposite - use of a ‘false flag’), a uniform, nonetheless are well-organised, 
well-prepared groups. The world is undoubtedly a more volatile place now 




Security is a vital piece of a structured society. Hence, by law, the State 
have the duty to protect all individuals, their physical integrity, fundamental 
freedoms, and the most precious right of them all, the right to life.    
As a State instrument, the Intelligence services hold the ability to be on the 
frontline of preventing and combating terrorism, since its purpose is to 
analyse, anticipate and forecast risk and threats. The distinctive methods of 
these services, provides them a unique position of being the utmost 
effective on defensive and offensive forefront of the rule of law. 
The aim of this dissertation is to answer to some of the issues raised above. 
Key issues: 
 What is terrorism? 
 How does a transnational terrorist group function? 
 Do the Portuguese intelligence services have the necessary tools to 
prevent and combat transnational terrorist groups? 
In the light of these key issues, this dissertation is divided in three main 
chapters. 
The first chapter serves as the basis to develop the dissertation. 
Predominantly focused on answering what is terrorism, what its evolution, 
origin and definitions.  




world stability, we decided to use the tactical analysis method 
(organisational charts, connections, modus operandi - in particular logistic 
support, money laundering and fundraising schemes), i.e. the dynamics and 
capabilities of a terrorist group. For this purpose, we selected Hezbollah, not 
only because it is acknowledged as one of the most capable terrorist 
groups, but also because of its power of action and mobilisation through its 
extensive network present across the five continents. There is vast literature 
analysing Hezbollah origins and their regional impact however, there a lack 
of research focused on profiling Hezbollah network and activities outside 
Lebanon. However, apart from Matthew Levitt’s work, there is a lack of 
research focused on profiling Hezbollah’s network outside Lebanon and for 
this reason and the reasons mentioned above, our choice was to focus on 
its action at an international level, particularly in Europe – geographical 
proximity to the Middle East (especially Southern Europe). In addition, apart 
from being a place where attacks are perpetuated, it can be used as launch 
pad of terrorists or as a logistics platform or even as a safe haven – and the 
Hezbollah activities in the Portuguese-speaking countries. 
In light of Hezbollah’s analysis and considering Portugal as a responsible 
actor of the international community, the third chapter will explore if Portugal 
intelligence services have the necessary tools to prevent and combat 
groups with these characteristics by introducing the intelligence concept, 




profile, followed by an analysis of the Portuguese intelligence services 
structure, purpose and cooperation mechanisms. Finally, we will present 
some of the major challenges and dilemmas that the intelligence community 
is presented with. 






TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: TERRORISM 
 
“For me the best way to fight against terrorism and extremism is just a 
simple thing: educate the next generation.” 
Malala Yousafzai 
 
1.1. The evolution of terrorism: 
The use of terrorism is nothing new, there is literature utterly dedicated to 
describe its evolution or its definition. It is a term approached by a variety of 
disciplines such as political science, international relations, 
security/intelligence studies, military studies, etc.  
Constantly confronted with the media broadcasting news related to terrorism 
on a daily basis we are however, most of the times, unacquainted with its 
ancient and complex roots.  
To understand the causes and circumstances of its evolutionary progress it 
is necessary to find its origin, its etymology.  
Terrorism, as a word, it is believed to have its origin in the Latin word 
Terror1, from the verb terrere to frighten, put in fear, terrify, scare, alarm  and 
                                                     
1
 According to several dictionaries such as Merriam-Webster - "Terror." Merriam-Webster.com.  
Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web.. Available from:  http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terror  
[Accessed: 20
th
 January 2015] or “Terrere” Perseus Digital Library –Tufts University, n.d. Web. 
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from the Greek trein to be afraid, tremein to tremble. 
The political connotation similar to the one used nowadays (besides its 
ancient roots), started merely during the French Revolution2.   
The suffix –ism, from the Latin –ismus and the Greek – ismos3 is used in a 
political, theoretical level or to refer to an attitude, a form of acting. As noted 
by Schmid (2011) the historic use of the suffix –ism was added to ‘terror’ 
after the reign of terror of 1793 – 1794 (France), however it is not clear that 
it is related with the examples above-mentioned.  
1.1.1. Reign of Terror 
‘Terror’ was declared as a legal instrument of state violence after the 5th of 
September 1793.  Subsequently, in June 1794, since Maximilen François 
Marie Isidore de Robespierre4 had publicly declared a new list of traitors, the 
                                                                                                                                                                
Available online at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu [Last Viewed: 20
th
 January 2015] 
2
 This word was introduced in the French language in the XIV Century. 
3
 Suffix of abstract substantives. ”-ismo". 2008-2013. Dicionário Priberam da Língua Portuguesa, 
n.d., Available online at: http://www.priberam.pt/dlpo/-ismo. [Last Viewed: 19
th
 October 2014] 
4
 (Born on 6
th
 of May 1758, Arras, France – Died on the 28
th
 of July 1794, Paris, France) Jurist and 
one of the key elements in the French Revolution, he was a radical Jacobin leader.  He fought for 
universal suffrage and the abolishment of slavery. Robiespierre controlled the Committee of Public 
Safety, the principal organ of the Revolutionary government during the Reign of Terror. Adapted 
from: Maximilien de Robespierre. 2015. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, n.d., Available online at: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/505619/Maximilien-de-Robespierre. [Last Viewed: 13
th
 
of January 2015]  
 




fear increased among the delegates of the French National Conservative 
Convention who have once supported him.  
Overthrown from the Committee of Public Safety on the 27th of June 1794, 
Robiespierre and his collaborators, as Schmid (2011) argues, could not 
indict Robiespierre of ‘terror’ without incriminating themselves, they had to 
find a way to exonerate them. The solution was to prosecute Robiespierre of 
terrorism 5  and after his imprisonment, without any trial, he and his 
companions were beheaded by the guillotine.  
It is estimated that 40.000 people, including the King Louis XVI of France, 
the Queen Marie Antoinette of France and Dr. Guilhotin (creator of the 
guillotine), were beheaded between 1783 until 1795. 
1.1.2. Ancient phenomenon 
As previously mentioned, terrorism it is nothing new.  The existence of ‘holly 
warriors’ dates back to the Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, their 
mission was to kill in the name of freedom. Nevertheless, it was during the 
XI to the XII centuries, in the Middle East, that a group of Shia Nizari Ismaili6 
(1090 - 1256) emerged known within the Crusades culture as the 
                                                     
5
 At that time the word terrorism was associated with a criminal abuse of power through a 
dictatorial, indiscriminate and disproportionate violence. 
6
 The Nizari has its origin with Nîzar (Mustanir’s firstborn). The highest point of this group was 
reached with the Alamût Reform in 1164. Thenceforth, there was a gradual unification between the 
Ismaili and the esoteric Sufism.    
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Assassins7.        
Led by the Persian al-Hassan ibn-al-Sabbah, this group had a political and 
religious agenda. According to Lewis (2003)8 the group modus operandi was 
almost ceremonial as they could invoke an ancient Islamic tradition: the 
religious obligation to free the world of tyrants. The target was carefully 
selected, usually important predominant political, military or religious 
leaders. Their weapon was a dagger and the assassin should not return to 
the Alamut Castle, it was his duty to wait on the crime scene for popular 
justice, since returning would be interpreted as an insult, an outrage.   
Silva (2010) underlines that Hassan ibn-al-Sabbah used this behaviour as a 
political weapon, to terrorise. This movement is set to be the initiators of the 
present suicide-bombers (the binomial die-kill).  
Although some scholars highlight the 9/11 as a shifting point, terrorism 
through time is present with different agendas, from left to right, acting local 
or global.  
 
 
                                                     
7
 From the Arabic Hashishyyin meaning ‘hashish user’. There are conflicting facts/sources about its 
origin. One is that the origin was distorted from aschishin meaning ‘follower of Hasan’.   
8
 In Silva, Teresa de Almeida e (2010) Sociedade e Cultura na Área Islâmica. Lisboa: Edição 
Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas. 





David Rapoport was a pioneer outlining a system of four waves categorising 
terrorism - different phases albeit with the same characteristics. 
The waves are defined as “cycle of activity in a given time period… 
characterised by expansion and contraction phases” (Rapoport, 2004, p.47). 
He argues that the legitimacy of these uprisings is diverse through the 
waves, and most of the groups with particular characteristics that contribute 
for the construction of the waves generally perish before the wave is 
predominant.  As a final point Rapoport claims that the ideologies can cross 
countries, regions and continents therefore the waves are transnational in 
character.  
Figure 1: Rapoport’s Four Waves 
 
The First Wave began after the Napoleon wars and the Congress of Vienna 
in 1815. The revolutionary ideas started to spread particularly in the South 
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fomented the fall of the Portuguese monarchy, starting with the regicide of 
the King Carlos I and the heir to the crown prince Luís Filipe (1st of February 
1908). Subsequently a coup d’état occurred, organised by the Portuguese 
Republican Party, with the aim of taking the power from the constitutional 
monarchy and afterwards establishing the Portuguese Republic (5th of 
October 1910). Nonetheless, it started with the assassination of Tsar 
Alexander II (13th of March 1881), the group who perpetrated the crime was 
Narodnaya Volya (The People’s Will). This wave includes, among others, 
the Civil War in the United States, the Ku Klux Klan9. 
The Anti-Colonial Wave is the Second Wave. It began after the end of the 
World War I with the aim of self-determination, to liberate themselves from 
the French, British, Portuguese (and others) colonial rule by breaking up 
these empires. All in all groups such as the Algerian Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN), Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Irgun10 (Zionist group in 
Israel) fought as guerrillas through ‘hit and run’ tactics. 
With the start of the Vietnam War plus the Cold War framework, the Third 
Wave known as ‘New Left Wave’ emerged. The internationalisation of 
terrorism started under the influence of the Marxist revolution with actions 
                                                     
9
 A secret right-wing extremist organisation founded, after the Civil War, in 1865 in Tennessee, 
United States. Their main purpose was to maintain the white supremacy, the purification of the 
United States through violent actions. 
10
 They introduced the term “freedom fighters” to describe their struggle against government, 
dissociating themselves from the First Wave type of groups. 




guided by the strong urge of the West World groups to help the Third World. 
Some notorious actions/tactics were high jacking and hostage takings, such 
as the ‘Black September’ (1972) performed by the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO), frequently broadcasted by the media spreading fear to 
a vast number of people. The Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigades, 
the German Baader-Meinhof, West German Red Army Faction (RAF) and 
the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) were also amid this type of 
terrorist groups.  
Finally, the Fourth Wave, identified as ‘Religious Wave’, began with the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union (1979) and the occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The 
religious political agenda was more appealing and congregating compared 
to Nationalist groups. Furthermore, the Soviet Union withdraw from 
Afghanistan, displayed a powerful message of religion eliminating a 
superpower from their land and after that, the United States became the 
next enemy to annihilate.  
Aum Shinrikyo from Japan, Tamil Tigers from Sri Lanka, Hamas from 
Palestine, the well-known Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah from Lebanon are 
groups that belong in this categorisation. 
Observing Rapoport’s Fourth Wave, we are inclined to think that a fifth wave 
it is starting soon. Nevertheless, it seems that this one in particular it is not 
fading and apart from his terrorism categorisation, several authors and 
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organisations attempt to organise or/and define it.  
1.2. Terrorism concept: Attempt of a definition 
The use of the term terrorism varies in different cultures and languages. Still 
a controversial topic, through time the same actions were on occasion, not 
considered an act of terrorism. 
We will briefly enumerate some of the most prominent and accepted 
definitions in a chronological manner (adapted from Schmid, 2011, p.99 FF).  
 
 Robespierre  (1794): 
“Terror is nothing else than immediate justice, sever, inflexible; it is 
therefore an outflow of virtue, it is not so much a specific principle than 
a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to the 
most pressing needs of the motherland.”  
 
 League of Nations Convention for the prevention and Repression 
of Terrorism (1937)  
“In the present Convention, the expression 'acts of terrorism' means 
criminal acts directed against a State an intended or calculated to 
create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group 
of persons or the general public.” 
 
 Wilkinson (1974): 
“Our main concern is with political terror: that is to say with the use of 
coercive intimidation by revolutionary movements, regimes or 
individuals. … We have thus identified some of the key characteristics 
common to all forms of political terror: indiscriminateness, 
unpredictability, arbitrariness, ruthless destructiveness and the 
implicitly amoral antinomian nature of a terrorist’s challenge. … 
Political terrorism, properly speaking, is a sustained policy involving 




the waging of organized terror either on the part of the state, a 
movement or faction, or by a small group of individuals. 
Systematic terrorism invariably entails some organizational structure, 
however rudimentary, and some kind of theory or ideology of terror.” 
 
 Laqueur (1977): 
“Terrorism, interpreted here as the use of covert violence by a group 
for political ends, is usually directed against a government, less 
frequently against another group, class or party. The ends may vary 
from the redress of specific ‘grievances’ to the overthrow of a 
government and the taking of power, or to the liberation of a country 
from foreign rule. Terrorists seek to cause political, social and 
economic disruption, and for this purpose frequently engage in 
planned or indiscriminate murder… .Note: Any definition of political 
terrorism venturing beyond noting the systematic use of murder, injury 
and destruction or the threats of such acts toward achieving political 
ends is bound to lead to endless controversies.” 
 
Apart from the previous definitions, Alex Schimd and Albert Jongman 
(1988), in pursuit of a clearer definition proposed themselves to find an 
academic consensus by asking their colleagues to define terrorism through 
the ‘Research Guide’. After analysing those solutions from 109 definitions, 
the conclusion was that twenty-two elements were matching.  Consequently, 
Schmid and Jongman attempted to define terrorism: 
 "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to 
assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. 
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The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen 
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message 
generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes 
between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets 
are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a 
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, 
depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is 
primarily sought" (Scmid, 1988, p. 28)  
The 9/11 event prompted the need to an effective and capable answer to 
prevent another similar act, a definition was urgent and necessary 
consequently most of the definitions were reconsidered, adjusted.  
 EU Definition of Terrorism (2001):  
“Offences intentionally committed by an individual or a group against 
one or more countries, their institutions or people, with the aim of 
intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political, 
economic, or social structures of a country.” 
 
 UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism (draft -2001): 
“UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism: Informal Texts of Art. 2 of the 
draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, prepared 
by the Coordinator: 
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and 
intentionally, causes: 
• Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 




• Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public 
use, a State or Government facility, a public transportation system, an 
infrastructure facility or the environment; or 
• Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in 
paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic 
loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” 
 
 European Union (2002):  
“An intentional act which may seriously damage a country or an 
international organisation, committed with the aim of seriously 
intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or a 
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any 
act, seriously destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures by means  of attacks 
upon a person's life, attacks upon the physical integrity of a person, 
kidnapping, hostage-taking, seizure of an aircraft or ships, or the 
manufacture, possession or transport of weapons or explosives.” 
 
 Chomsky (2003):  
“Terrorism is the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to 
attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature... 
through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear.” 
 
 NATO (2003):  
“The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against 
individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate 
governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological 
objectives.” 
 
 Lei n.º 52/2003 de 22 de Agosto -  Portuguese Law to Combat 
Terrorism (2003)  
“Artigo 2.º Organizações terroristas  
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1 - Considera-se grupo, organização ou associação terrorista todo o 
agrupamento de duas ou mais pessoas que, actuando 
concertadamente, visem prejudicar a integridade e a independência 
nacionais, impedir, alterar ou subverter o funcionamento das 
instituições do Estado previstas na Constituição, forçar a autoridade 
pública a praticar um acto, a abster-se de o praticar ou a tolerar que 
se pratique, ou ainda intimidar certas pessoas, grupos de pessoas ou 
a população em geral, mediante: 
a) Crime contra a vida, a integridade física ou a liberdade das 
pessoas; 
b) Crime contra a segurança dos transportes e das comunicações, 
incluindo as informáticas, telegráficas, telefónicas, de rádio ou de 
televisão; 
c) Crime de produção dolosa de perigo comum, através de incêndio, 
explosão, libertação de substâncias radioactivas ou de gases tóxicos 
ou asfixiantes, de inundação ou avalancha, desmoronamento de 
construção, contaminação de alimentos e águas destinadas a 
consumo humano ou difusão de doença, praga, planta ou animal 
nocivos; 
d) Actos que destruam ou que impossibilitem o funcionamento ou 
desviem dos seus fins normais, definitiva ou temporariamente, total 
ou parcialmente, meios ou vias de comunicação, instalações de 
serviços públicos ou destinadas ao abastecimento e satisfação de 
necessidades vitais da população; 
e) Investigação e desenvolvimento de armas biológicas ou químicas; 
«f) Crimes que impliquem o emprego de energia nuclear, armas de 
fogo, biológicas ou químicas, substâncias ou engenhos explosivos, 
meios incendiários de qualquer natureza, encomendas ou cartas 
armadilhadas; 
sempre que, pela sua natureza ou pelo contexto em que são 
cometidos, estes crimes sejam susceptíveis de afectar gravemente o 
Estado ou a população que se visa intimidar.” 
 




 Stepanova (2006) “...the intentional use or threat of violence against 
civilians and non-combatants by a non-state (sub-national or 
transnational) actor in an asymmetrical confrontation, in order to 
achieve political goals.” 
 
 Richardson (2006) “Terrorism simply means deliberately and 
violently targeting civilians for political purposes. It has seven crucial 
characteristics... [F]irst, a terrorist act is politically inspired... Second, 
if an act does not involve violence or the threat of violence, it is not 
terrorism. ...Third, the point of terrorism is not to defeat the enemy but 
to send a message... Fourth, the act and the victim usually have 
symbolic significance... Fifth – and this is a controversial point – 
terrorism is the act of sub-state groups, not states... A sixth 
characteristic of terrorism is that the victim of the violence and the 
audiences the terrorists are trying to reach are not the same. ...The 
final and most important defining characteristic of terrorism is the 
deliberated targeting of civilians.” 
 
 Rapoport (2008):  
“'Terror' is violence with distinctive properties used for political 
purposes both by private parties and states. That violence is 
unregulated by publicly accepted norms to contain violence, the rules 
of war, and the rules of punishment. Private groups using terror 
generally disregard rules of punishment, i.e. those enabling us to 
distinguish guilt from innocence. But both states and non-state groups 
can ignore either set of rules. 
 
 Schmid (2011): 
“Terror' is a state of mind characterized by intense fear of a 
threatening danger on an individual level and by a climate of fear 
on the collective level. ’Terrorism', on the other hand, is an activity, 
method or tactic which, as a psychological outcome, aims to 
produce 'terror'.”  
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In general, most of the definitions abovementioned fail to include the State 
as an actor capable of terrorism actions or the aim/purpose of those actions. 
From our perspective the combination of Wilkinson’s, Shmid’s, Chomsky’s, 
Richardson’s first three characteristics and particularly Rapoport’s have the 
elements of a proper definition:  
- Act perpetuated by and individual, group, organisation, State + 
Intentional acts that disrupt/destroy (political, social and economic) 
structured society + Direct victims (random or representative /symbolic) 
with the intention of provoking intense fear through their actions + With 
predominantly political, (religious, ideology) aim. 
Nonetheless, yet again the term terrorism varies in different cultures and 
languages plus there are vast regional differences. Most prominent and 
universal accepted definitions continue to be predominantly from male, 
western authors.  
Even without a clear definition, every State has the responsibility within their 
rule of law to safeguard their people. We cannot allow our society, our 
security to be threatened by terrorist groups or other destabilising agents.  
Although making an immense effort, scholars and the international 
community still have not reach a universal definition and may perhaps never 
find it. Most of the definitions are vague or to strict and that can offer a place 
for wrong interpretation.  




Terrorism is continuously evolving. What were the main factors that led 
terrorism to achieve its transnational character? 
1.3. Terrorism pathway: From national to transnational  
The Rapoport’s categorisation of terrorism highlights that, terrorism actions 
were predominantly characterised with a nationalistic ideology. Nonetheless, 
although still present, that was about to change.  
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire between 1800 until 1923 new 
States emerged.  In addition, according to Costa (2000, p. 195), the British 
and Russian expansionist tendencies, particularly in the Middle East, and 
the fall of the Qadjar11 dynasty left Iran fragmented. The combination of 
those factors placed the Middle East into a delicate position. 
After World War I Palestine once administrate by the Ottoman Empire, was 
now administrated by the British. With a post-World War II scenario, 
considering the cost of their participation and the previous commitment with 
the Jew community through ‘The Balfour Declaration’ (1917), Britain was 
placed in an economic and political fragile situation. Consequently, they had 
no choice but to deliver the administration to the United Nations in 1948. 
A turbulent period ended, nonetheless a clash of ideologies and agendas 
between the United States and USSR, would submerge the world into a 
new crisis acknowledge as the Cold War. Therefore, this new bipolar 
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(purpose) ORGANISED CRIME: 
LUCRATIVE (purpose) 
environment would set the Middle East and some African countries into a 
battlefield, though there was never a direct physical confrontation between 
the two superpowers. The conflicts increase then again they were also 
‘controlled’ by the US/USSR. 
Afterward with the end of the Cold and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the 
USSR ‘imploded’ and all the internal problems emerged. With the change of 
circumstances, terrorist groups willing to survive made the choice to ally with 
organised crime groups.  
The association of terrorism with organised crime is undoubtedly one of the 
key elements of the metamorphosis of international terrorism into 
transnational. 
Although, the majority of academics accept that there is a difference 
between terrorist and organised crime activities: 










To summarise the shifting points were: 




To understand better the dynamics of a terrorist group capability, the next 
chapter is an analysis of Hezbollah, known as one of the most capable 
terrorist groups to thrive. 

























CASE STUDY: HEZBOLLAH, A ‘GLOCAL’ GROUP 
 
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not to fear the result of 
a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory 
gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor 
yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” 
Sun Tzu 
 
Since its formation in Lebanon12, Hezbollah has carried out several terrorist 
attacks, nonetheless their actions are not exclusive of a national or regional 
scenario they are global. 
As noted by some authors Al-Qaeda and recently groups like self-
proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ Group (Daesh) aka ISIL aka ISIS, Boko Haram, 
Al-Shabab and so on, take hold of all the headlines as Hezbollah, 
considered by Richard Armitage as the “A-team of terrorism”, grows 
dangerously ‘quiet’ in the shadows. 
Acknowledged as a resistance group Hezbollah is also a social movement 
and a political party. However, in this chapter we will focus on 
comprehending how a transnational terrorism group works. Hence, we 
propose a modest analysis with emphasis on Hezbollah’s activities outside 
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Lebanon, as Levitt (2013) highlights “there is a gap between the 
organization’s activities in Lebanon and its global infrastructure”. We will 
focus particularly their ‘self-financing network’, as traditionally understood as 
separate phenomenon, organised crime and terrorism are not often linked 
by security and law enforcement agencies.  
“Understanding Hizbullah requires a multifaceted conceptual framework that 
combines theories of crisis, revolution, leadership, personality, social class, 
and political parties.” (Hamzeh, 2004, p.2)  
2.1. Hezbollah’s inception 
The Ayatollah Mahmoud Ghaffari originally created the Party of God, 
Hezbollah, in Iran in 1973. Silva (2010), notes that Hadi, Ghaffari’s son, 
became the leader of the party although with no relevance. On the other 
hand, the militants of the Party of God became the armed proxy for the 
Islamic Republican Party, the Party of the Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah 
Beheshti, Ayatollah Khameni and Ali Rafsanjani13. Also in 1982, twenty-five 
radical Islamic organisations, ordered by the Iranian regime, were included 
in a restructure of the Party of God.   
June 1982, with the Israel incursion of southern Lebanon, Iran finds a 
pretext to deploy, according to Hamzeh (1993), around 1,500 Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards to Bekaa (Biqua) region and the opportunity to export 
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its revolution. The Lebanese Hezbollah14 is born.  
Sayyd Husayn al-Musawi, former Amal member, became its official leader 
until is assassination in 1992. According to Avon and Khatchadourian 
(2012), Hassan Nasrallah, follower of Musa al-Sadr and identified as a 
“member of the Baseq Force of the Resistance”, leader of the Baalbek 
region, left Amal in June 1982. Nasrallah became Mussawi’s recognised 
successor and it was elected as Secretary General since then. 
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October 1983, the US embassy and Marine Corps in Beirut were brutally 
destroyed by a suicide attack that claimed the life of hundreds. This attack 
consolidated the group’s image as leader of the Shia. 
2.1.1. Lebanon Political Background 
Lebanon political division is deep-rooted dating back to civil war (1860), par-
ticularly after the downfall of the Ottoman Empire plus the French League of 
Nations Mandate.  
The National Pact (1943), an agreement between Lebanese leaders, intro-
duced a ‘fair’ political system of a 6:5 formula that would distribute repre-
sentatives according to their sect. 
Norton (2007) highlights that Christian Maronite’s were in charge of the 
presidency, the Sunnis premiership and the Shia speakership, a position 
with minor influence on the political system. As a result, Christians and Sun-
ni were privileged with access to strategic economic sectors, on the other 
hand the Shia, the fastest growing community at the time, remained dedi-
cated to agriculture. The development of this situation had a damaging im-
pact on the Shia people subsequently the Lebanese Diaspora started once 
again, with Africa, South America and the Gulf on the top of the list. 
With the decay of the Shia community conditions, Harakat Amal (The 
Movement of Hope) in the early 1970’s, an organised Shia party led by the 
Imam Musa al-Sadr, was born.  
The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating 
transnational terrorism: The rising of the Party of God, Hezbollah 
26 
 
The Palestine war (1948/49), as Norton (2007) underlines, pushed thou-
sands of Palestinians to South Lebanon, were most of the Shia live(d), 
stressing the existing precarious work conditions. Adding to that the Jorda-
nian civil war of 1970/71 presented Lebanon with a new challenge, not only 
with the increasing numbers of Palestinians on Lebanese soil, but also with 
Palestinian guerrillas, such as Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), 
that would threat the government authority. 
In the 1960’s, concerning the Shia community, the four dominant political 
trends were: 
Figure 5: Shia dominant political trends 
  
 “Amal challenged the stifling and often brutal domination of the Palestinian 
guerrillas whose public support plummeted in the late 1970s and early 
1980s for bringing southern Lebanon into crossfire with Israel. Israel's inva-
sion of the 1978, the “Litani Operation”, (…) displaced hundreds of thou-
sands of Lebanese from the southern region.” (Norton, 2007, p.22) 
Secularism Liberation 
Islamism Reformis 




During the “Litani Operation” the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
established the Resolutions 425 and 42615 - specifying Israel withdraw from 
Lebanon as well as a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to 
intercede as a peace keeping force. Yet before the Israeli invasion the 
panorama in Lebanon was critical with the outbreak of the civil war 
(1975/89). 
A restructure of the parliament recognised as ‘The Ta’if Agreement’ (1989), 
signed in the Saudi city of Tai’f, ended the civil war. One of Ta’if corner-
stones was to call all militias to disarm, Hezbollah was now on the spotlight 
and it was confronted with a challenging situation that was solved astutely. 
Hezbollah’s choice was to participate in the Lebanese system via politics 
and at the same time, preserve the right of resistance. 
Rafiq Hariri, a former Lebanese Prime Minister, died in a terrorist attack 
(14/02/2005) in the Beirut, along with several others. His death had deep 
implications in the country, opening the way for the Cedar Revolution and 
the withdrawal, after twenty-nine years of permanence, of the Syrian troops. 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (UN) was set to investigate Hariri’s death 
and it has allegedly found enough evidence to link the attack back to Hez-
bollah.  
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Resistance in the Shia context is a deeply rooted concept. Hezbollah is 
pointed by many as the introductory of suicide16 bombing as a cost/effective 
weapon. Nasrallah speeches are full of the Battle of Karbala17 and the mar-
tyrdom of Husain, the son of Fatima (Prophet Mohammed’s daughter) and 
Ali ibn Abu Talib (cousin and son-in law of the Prophet Mohammed), refer-
ences to instigate the Shia to fulfil their duty through jihad. Husain’s action 
was vital to transmit that the Shia community must resist against the op-
pressors and abusive power, it is a fundamental pillar of the Shia narrative 
as well as the link to the present-day Shia activism and collective identity. 
Pointed as a founding text by most scholars, the group ideology can be bet-
ter understood by analysing the ‘Open Letter’18 (16th of February 1985). 
The ‘Open Letter’ states, amid other matters, that: 
"Our primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist 
entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands wrested from their 
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 Istishhad: Sacrifice of one’s own life for the sanctification of Allah’s name, in the context of an 
Islamic military campaign against the enemy. 
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 680 A.D. as the Shia refused the authority of a Caliph that was non-descendent of Prophet 
Mohammed, Husain and his followers marched into Damascus to destitute Yazidi’s illegitimate 
power. The result of this incursion was the brutal massacre of Husain’s faction and himself.  
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 To read the full letter please consult: Avon, Dominique and Khatchadourian, Anaïs-T.(2012) 
Hezbollah: a history of the "party of God". Translated from French by Jane Marie Todd. London: 
Harvard University Press.[p.103/120] 
 




owners, at the expense of the rights of the Muslim people. Therefore our 
struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty 
with it, no cease-fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or 
consolidated." (Avon and Khatchadourian, 2012, pp.103-120) 
The main ideas are:  
Figure 6: Key pillars of Hezbollah ideology 
 
 
The first pillar and the third are vital since the group use of violence and 
terror are central to its ideology. During 1984/85, as highlighted by Norton 
(2007), dozens/hundreds members of the Communist Party were 
assassinated simply because Hezbollah decided to free the world from the 




















































United States . 
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During 2009, Hezbollah published the ‘Political Charter’19, the second letter 
since the ‘Open Letter’ of 1985. The purpose of this release was to highlight 
their current political vision/position, ambitions, so on and so forth, to 
‘complement’ the first document that was neglecting Hezbollah’s political 
strategy.   
Hamzeh (1993) adds that the ideology is: 
 Formulated by the political writings of Ayatollahs Muhammad Baqir 
al-Sadr and Ruhollah Khomeini  + Experience of the Iranian 
revolution; 
 Obeys to the Governance of the Religious Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) in 
the absenteeism of the Twelfth Imam; 
Silva (2010) points out that, apart from being simplistic in their ideology, they 





                                                     
19
 To read the full letter please consult: Avon, Dominique and Khatchadourian, Anaïs-T.(2012) 
Hezbollah: a history of the "party of God". Translated from French by Jane Marie Todd. London: 
Harvard University Press. [p.130/162] 




2.3. Hezbollah’s (In) Visible Structure and Modus Operandi 
During the decades of 1960s until 1980s, the organisational structures of 
terrorist groups were predominantly ‘star shaped’. It was easier to identify it 
with the capture of its leaders.  
Presently, with the evolution of the structures, we no longer can make the 
assumption of a network dependable on an exclusive leader (although the 
group may have a ‘public’ leader like Hassan Nasrallah in Hezbollah). 
Groups are now decentralised, organised in independent cells with the 
power of acting alone and sometimes without the knowledge of other ‘twin’ 
cells. Therefore, if discovered and dismantled the other cell(s) can still 
pursue their mission/act. Eventually it makes it harder for the intelligence 
services to penetrate this kind of structure.   
Hezbollah acts in different arenas:  
 National (politics – sometimes employing violence against opposition; 
social movement; militia/resistance);  
 Regional (particularly in Israel/Palestine arena + Syria, Yemen; 
Bahrain); 
 Global (five continents – intricate network: intelligence gathering; 
sleeper cells; attacks; logistical support; fundraising; money 
laundering; money and documents counterfeit; trafficking) 
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2.3.1. (In) Visible Structure  
As Hezbollah evolves into a more legitimate group, in part because of its 
involvement in politics and welfare, the demand for a more transparent 
structure grows. Nonetheless, there is ‘still place’ for a secretive structure20 
within the group.    
 According to Hamzeh (1993), a consultative council (Supreme Shura 
Council), plus several committees composes the Hezbollah structure. After 
the National Pact the group started a political life, hence a public structure 
was necessary to legitimise it. In terms of leadership, Hezbollah presents a 
collective leadership instead of the usual one charismatic leader. In addition, 
the Ulama is vital on its structure.  
Following Hamzeh’s (1993) opinion, seven members 21 , majority clerics, 
constitute Hezbollah’s Shura Council. With executive, political, legislative, 
judicial and military power, this Council is the highest authority inside the 
structure. All decisions must pass through the Shura Council and require a 
majority vote, in circumstance of impasse the Supreme Leader, the 
Ayatollah in Iran will decide, as he is the supreme Juris consult.  
Additionally, the summarized explanation of Hezbollah’s organisation 
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 Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Shaykh Naim Kassim, Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli 
and Shaykh Abu Salem Yaghi (Musawi’s place was not filled). 




structure described by Hamzeh consists in: 
 Secretary General: Ex-officio chairman of the Executive Council  
 Composed by several heads of districts + 5 members 
(named/appointated by the Shura Cuncil) 
 Politburo: Constituted by 15 members; Coordinates the work of the 
committees + directs the activity of three organs:  
1) Enforcement Recruitment and Propaganda: Supervises three 
sections: Network of preachers + Al-Hawzat (circles of learning) – 
important as the preachers + research and propaganda section: 
manages the media. 
2) Holy Reconstruction Organ: Divided in eight committees; 
Supervised by a committee of the Holy Reconstruction Organ; 
Provides support to Hezbollah members, new recruits and followers 
via medical care, financial aid, housing, public utilities; Reliefs 
underprivileged regions of Lebanon. 
3) Security Organ: Divided into three sections: Party Security section: 
Protection of the leaders/members + Central Security section: 
network of surveillance and Intelligence gathering (internal and 
external) + Operational Security section: carries decisions of the 
overall Security Organ. 
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 Combat Organ: Controlled directly by the Shura Council; Organised 
in two groups: the Islamic Resistance, responsible for suicide attacks 
against Israeli/Western targets and Islamic Holy War, accountable for 
conventional attacks against Israeli troops. 
Levitt (2013) with an updated version also explains that the Secretary 
General, presently Hassan Nasrallah, presides the Shura Council, which is 
the entity that deliberates all elements of the group’s activities. In addition, 
explains that there are five administrative bodies: 
 Executive Council role: Management of daily operations + 
supervises all education, cultural, political, social affairs; 
 Political Council role:  Management of Hezbollah’s external 
relations + Group’s political relations inside Lebanon + organisation 
of public information/propaganda through several subcommittees; 
 Parliamentary Council role: Organisation of the party’s 
parliamentarians activities + studies proposed legislation brought 
before the government; 
 Judicial Council role: Management of disputes in regulatory matters 
(between members or between the organisation and non-members) 
 Jihad (military) Council role: (Headed by Mustapha Badreddine) 
Accountable for official militia (Islamic Resistance) activities + Covert 




actions through the Islamic Jihad Organisation (IJO)22, headed by 
Talal Hamiyeh; Divided into smaller units to protect the structure; 
Three subgroups: central, preventive and overseas security – 
Terrorist/Militia wing plus security organ report to it. 
The nature of the last council above mentioned, apart from the others, it is 
maintained ‘private’ as most of the parliamentarians and officials are not 
acquainted with their activities. Nonetheless, as it happens with all the other 
matters, the senior leaders of the Shura Council supervise them.  
On the other hand Abboud and Muller (2012) highlight that the decision-
making within the structure might not be as we know. Also adds that 
Nasrallah took the Secretary General position for life abolishing the three-
year mandate rule. Nonetheless, the election of other member occurs in the 
General Conference through an Electoral College system.  
Abboud and Muller (2012) clarify as well, that no one inside the Party 
intentionally knows about the location, weaponry or military activities of the 
Resistance Council (Levitt’s Jihad Council) allowing strategic ambiguity.  
Apart from that, Hezbollah’s structure description is quite similar to Levitt’s.  
 
 
                                                     
22
 Also known as Special Security Apparatus (SSA) or External Security Organisation (ESO) 
The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating 
transnational terrorism: The rising of the Party of God, Hezbollah 
36 
 
2.3.2. Recruitment  
Since its inception, Hezbollah managed to establish a powerful transnational 
network particularly backed by the Lebanese Shia emigrant communities.   
Providing a network of social services that includes financial aid, medical 
care, housing, education, cultural activities and religious services Hezbollah 
exploits this as excellent tactic on the battle of “winning hearts and minds”. 
The population, as a form of expressing gratitude, may effortlessly get into 
the process of enlistment.  
Although efficient there are other methods of recruitment, particularly in the 
Mosques, where Hezbollah can reinforce their doctrine and “Al-Hawzat al-
'ilmiyyah (circles of learning) (…) they represent the basic element in 
Hizbullah's recruitment process and its slow infiltration policy among the 
people. The most important of these Hawzat are: the Religious Hawzat of 
Siddikin in South Lebanon, the Centre for Youth Education in Jibsheet 
(South Lebanon), the Educational Hawzat in Brital (Biqa'), the Iranian 
Religious Centre in Tyre, and the Centre for Islamic Martial Arts in Kabrikha 
(South Lebanon).” (Hamzeh, 1993) 
Based on Rudner (2010) explanation, each element of recruit is trained in 
numerous skills, after assessment the new recruits are assigned to different 
contingents according to their performance. 




There are four operational contingents in the combat division: 
Figure 7: Hezbollah operational contingents 
 
2.3.2.1. The Vital role of Communication  
It is argued that Hezbollah’s has sophisticated and complex communications 
system. “That system included radio networks, copper wire phone systems, 
cellular and fiber optic networks, and VoIP networks which now extend into 
the global cyber domain. The individual elements of Hezbollah’s 
communications system were neither novel nor exotic. Hezbollah 
communication was set apart by the scaled, disciplined, and systematic 
deployment of a layered communications architecture, from copper land 
lines to encrypted VoIPs” (Wege, 2014, p.248). 
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In fact, the communication apparatus that Hezbollah owns23 it is, not only 
lucrative, but also basilar for heavy propaganda and recruitment campaigns. 
Al-Manār television, radio stations such as al-Nour, Baqiyyat allāh or the 
press as the al-'Ahd which became al-Intiqād (based on Avon’s 
Organisational Chart of 2012) are used as a tool, also “The research and 
propaganda section runs two radio stations, Sawt al-Iman (Voice of Faith) 
and Sawt al Nidal (Voice of Struggle), and one television station called al-
Manar (the Beacon). In addition, there are two publications: al-Ahed (the 
party's main mouthpiece), which appears weekly, and the al-Bilad, which 
appears monthly.” (Hamzeh, 1993). There is a general acceptance that 
Hezbollah is the first group to use a camera as a weapon and clearly, they 
take advantage of their widespread communications network to promote 
their ideology and strategic goals. 
The internet is also a powerful propaganda/recruitment tool for Hezbollah, 
the use of official websites such as www.hizbollah.tv and the personal page 
of Hassan Nasrallah www.nasrollah.org are proof of that. Nevertheless, the 
use of social media by other groups, for instance ‘Islamic State’ (Daesh), is 
heavily used as method of recruitment however, there is no public evidence 
of its utilisation by Hezbollah. 
Rudner (2010) points out that this media outlet is used as a mechanism of 
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animosity stimulation against Israel and the US. In addition to that, it works 
as a psychological warfare tool as well as an instrument to validate jihad 
against the infidels.  
2.3.3. Targets 
Although targets for terrorist attacks may vary from critical infrastructures 
(symbolic value), to events or the selection of prominent personalities, 
Hezbollah current targets are predominantly Israeli diplomatic missions, 
Israelis on holidays plus, US/Western targets on a minor scale.     
2.3.4. Weaponry 
It is difficult to predict Hezbollah’s weaponry stock because of its secrecy. 
Nonetheless, there is a report from 2003 which argues that Hezbollah’s 
capability for an offensive was increasing. The group had an estimated 
arsenal composed with: “upgraded anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, 
missile launchers, land-to-land missiles of various types, including long-
range (43 km) Fajr-3 missiles and Fajr-5 missiles (with a 75 km range)”. 
Moreover, a “high level of technological skills and sophistication all far 
exceed the known standards of terrorist organizations worldwide (…) highly 
sophisticated tactical as well as operational capabilities.” (The Meir Amit 
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2003,pp.9-16). 
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In 2012, the update of the report above-mentioned underlines that, 
Hezbollah weaponry is estimated in: 
60,000 rockets and missiles with short, medium and long ranges 
C-802 shore-to-ship missiles + Ababil UAVs  
Iranian-manufactured 122mm rockets         range of between 20/40 
kilometres 
Iranian Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets      range of between 43/75 
kilometres 
 
240mm flak rockets        range of 10 kilometres 
Iranian-manufactured Fatah 110 rockets       range of 250 kilometres 
Iranian-manufactured Zelzal rockets        range of 250 kilometres 
Syrian-manufactured 302mm rockets      range of between 110/115 
kilometres.  
2.4. Hezbollah Transnational Network: ‘Routes’ of Self-funding  
Hezbollah in 2014 was considered, by most intelligence services, as a 
serious threat, as well as a source of terrorism. Currently, perhaps due to 
Iranian nuclear power negotiation and combat against ‘Islamic State’ 
(Daesh), Western powers avoid mentioning it. Nevertheless, most of us 
have a vague idea what is Hezbollah but no idea of the extent and impact of 




their activities.  
With the dissemination of a transnational world, any place may serve as a 
recruitment or logistical support for terrorists, amidst other things. These 
groups are continuously searching new acting arenas as well as taking 
advantage on country weaknesses, for instance to gather intelligence, to 
use a country as a safe haven, to have easy access to forged documents, 
where money laundering policies are laid back. 
As Syria faces its fourth year of civil War and Iran a strong economic pres-
sure, Hezbollah, once heavily subsidised by its patrons, ensured a comple-
mentary funding (legal and illegal) sources through its transnational net-
work.   
Rudner (2010) emphasise that analysts estimate that Hezbollah’s interna-
tional network may have cells with 15,000 operatives in countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Belgium, Britain, France, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, 
Paraguay, several African countries and Asia, the US, Canada, and so on 
and so forth.  
Levitt (2013) conducts an extensive research on Hezbollah’s activities out-
side Lebanon comprising all five continents. Based on his work, we decided 
to emphasise the group’s activities predominantly in Portuguese speaking 
countries and Europe. 
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2.4.1. South America 
With the fall of the Ottoman Empire the first waves of migration started. The 
influx of people from Syria and Lebanon to Argentina and Brazil was con-
siderable during the 1880s (around 80,000) and again during the Lebanese 
civil war (1975/1990) in the 1980s. Authorities estimate that Hezbollah for-
mal cells were established during that period, comprising several hundred 
operatives at the tri-border of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, particularly at 
Ciudad Del Este, known as a safe haven for terrorist, among other negative 
things. 
The Israeli embassy (1992) and the Jewish community centre Asociación 
Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) attacks in Argentina (1994) pushed the 
Argentinian, Paraguayan and Brazilian authorities into a deep investigation. 
 Source: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2012) Hezbollah: Portrait of 
a Terrorist Organization, p.42) 
 




The result of those investigations had the following worthwhile discoveries: 
 The Buenos Aires/Tri-border cells, led by Samuel el-Reza, a Hezbol-
lah contact person, planned to blast the Israeli embassy. The select-
ed method to accomplish this task was a car bomb, more precisely 
the use of a Ford F-100 van purchased by a man with Portuguese 
accent. Claimed by the Islamic Jihad, according to them, the attack 
was perpetuated to honour Hussein (Mussawi’s son). However, ac-
cording to Alberto Nizman, has Levitt (2013) points out, the attack 
may be perhaps a response, a retaliatory act to the suspension of the 
shipment of nuclear material made by the Argentinian government. 
 As for the AMIA attack in 1994, Levitt (2013) argues that Mohsen 
Rabbani, a radical cleric and the head of the Fundación Cultural Ori-
ente, was a key element. The funding of this attack, allegedly, 
passed through Rabbanis’s accounts at Deutsch Bank, Banco Su-
dameris and Banco Tornequist from the Iranian Bank Melli (purport-
edly linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard) through Unión de 
Bancos Suizos.  
 Rabbani and el-Reza are key figures in the well-known Barakt’s net-
work. This network is the perfect example of Hezbollah capabilities 
abroad. According to Levitt (2013, p.82/84), the “Barakat network” 
headed by Assad Barakat24, carried money to Lebanon and from 
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 A prominent Lebanese businessperson that lived in Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil side). 
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Lebanon to South America.  Besides collecting sensitive information, 
one of the key activities of the network is raising money through the 
trafficking of narcotics to the Middle East and Europe. The major 
sources of the network’s profits, apart from trafficking drugs (or other 
items), are often related to extortion of Lebanese local storekeepers, 
fraud schemes and the use of front shops, for instance the use of 
electronics “Casa Apollo”, “Barakat Import Export Ltd” or “Piloto Tur-
ismo” a travel agency headed by Farouk Abdul Omairi and Moham-
mah Abdallah. 
















 Tax evasion indictment against Barakat led the Brazilian authorities to 
search “Casa Apollo” in 2001. Attempting to escape to Angola, the 
Paraguayan authorities detained Barakat in 2002. 
According to Paniago (2007) there are more Lebanese people in Brazil than 
in Lebanon itself, besides, they have a strong impact in the community. It is 
difficult for Brazil to preclude elected Hezbollah members of parliament of 
the Lebanese government to visit, as well as to ‘draw a line’ to distinguish 
between zakat25 contribution to their home country and donations to finance 
terrorism. Furthermore, according to an article pointed by Levitt (2013) is 
“Without anybody noticing, a generation of Islamic extremists is appearing in 
Brazil.”  
Rabbani’s group is presently on the shipping business, with containers arriv-
ing into the port of São Paulo and disappearing on their way to the tri-
border. Moreover, it is believe that in general, Hezbollah is still overactive in 
this continent. 
2.4.2. Africa 
West Africa, particularly Sierra Leone, was one of the preferred places for 
the Lebanese diaspora.  
Hezbollah, allegedly, has the advantage to establish powerful networks in-
side the ‘diaspora’ community and the African country is no exception. The 
networks present in this continent are essential to provide training to the op-
                                                     
25
 Legal donation, it is a religious duty and one of the five Islam pillars (al-arkan al-khamsa) 
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eratives, to recruit, gather intelligence as well as, a springboard for attacks 
in other countries but above all to finance their global network. 
Levitt (2013) highlights that the Paraguayan authorities estimate that after 
the 1992 and 1994 attacks in Argentina, Angola was a place where Hezbol-
lah affiliates would go to reorganise, perhaps in view of a great deal of front 
companies.  
Moreover, Angola and Sierra Leone, among other African countries, are part 
of the countries where diamond trading/smuggling occurs and where a con-
siderable number of groups, including Hezbollah, use diamonds to finance 
their networks.  
Levitt (2013) argues that a report from the Belgian military intelligence 
(2000) found some convincing facts that diamonds smuggled from Angola to 
Antwerp were linked to Lebanese groups. Furthermore, the trade of a con-
siderable amount of diamonds occurred in the course of the Angola civil War 
(1975/2002), before and during the UN embargo. During this period, Leba-
nese buyers connected to Hezbollah, acquired diamonds from National Un-
ion for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The profits provenient 
from the diamond trade were transferred to Iran, Lebanon and Syria.   
In addition to diamond smuggling/trading in Africa, drug trafficking is 
acknowledged as one of the major sources of Hezbollah’s income, especial-




ly with the declaration of Hezbollah’s spiritual leader emphasising that this 
action is morally acceptable when the consumers are the ‘Western heretics’. 
According to Levitt (2013) the symbiosis of weak or non-existent laws with 
high levels of corruption made Guinea-Bissau a desirable place for drug traf-
ficking groups, particularly provenient from South America. With formal and 
informal networks in both sides of the Atlantic, Hezbollah uses Guinea-
Bissau and West African countries as a launch pad to reach Europe, par-
ticularly Southern Europe. 
2.4.3. Europe 
The Middle East (in) stability has strong impact in international security, in 
Europe26, particularly in Southern European countries mainly because of its 
geographic proximity and Portugal is not immune to this. 
In fact, several factors make Europe desirable: 
 Most of the countries have an open society; 
 Before 9/11, Madrid 11/03 and London 7/7 attacks, European coun-
tries were considered ‘relaxed’ in terms of security + small number of 
travel restrictions (including countries with special agreements with 
their former colonies or/and facilitating guest workers); 
 Considerable Middle Eastern communities (predominantly in Western 
European countries) that could offer shelter, cover, and so on;  
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 Please consult Hezbollah impact in Europe map, p.116 
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 Terrorist groups aspire to release operatives arrested in European 
countries. 
Hezbollah has been involved in many terrorist attacks against Europeans. 
Nevertheless, it is also acknowledged by the intelligence services as capa-
ble of using European countries as a logistic platform, to gather intelligence, 
to raise funds via legal and illegal businesses/methods, overall a launch pad 
for terrorist attacks.  
Figure 9:  Hezbollah’s use of European countries 
 
Source: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2012) Hezbollah: Portrait of a 
Terrorist Organization, p.100) 
Through the Islamic Jihad group, Hezbollah first operation in European soil 
can be traced to 13th of November 1983 when an attack took place at a train 
station plus the train Paris/Marseille. Levitt (2013) hints that approximately 
one year later, at Zurich airport, the Lebanese Hussein Hanih Atat  ready to 
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detection of numerous pounds of explosives in his belongings. Approximate-
ly two weeks later of Hanih Atat capture, Italian authorities detained seven 
Lebanese students that were planning an attack against the US embassy in 
Rome. 
Levitt (2013) highlights that in a short period of time Hezbollah action was 
felt in several European countries, for instance: 
 Kuwait (1983) the French and US embassies suffered  an orchestrat-
ed bomb attack;  
 Torrejon, Spain (12th of April 1985), a blast destroyed the restaurant 
named ‘El Descanso’, injuring and killing several people (claimed by 
Islamic Jihad and other groups);  
 A TWA flight 847, from Athens to Rome was high jacked by the Islam-
ic Jihad to smuggle guns and hand grenades (Imad Mughniyeh was 
one of the operatives and the mastermind of this action);   
 Copenhagen, Denmark (July 1985) was the place selected to blast an 
office of the US-based Northwest Orient Airlines and the oldest syna-
gogue in Scandinavia; 
  Paris, France (December 1985/September 1986), 15 places were 
bombed, including a shopping gallery on the Champ Elysées (claimed 
by the Committee of Solidarity with the Arab and the Middle East Po-
litical Prisoners (CSPPA), later linked to Iran and Hezbollah); 
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 Air Afrique flight to Congo was high jacked over Milan, landed in Ge-
neva to refuel (Swiss authorities arrested the Hezbollah hijacker Hos-
sein Ali Mohammed Hariri). 
Hamadi’s group in Germany, led by Mohammad Ali Hamadi (operative in the 
TWA flight 847), was supposedly in charge of providing drugs and arms  to 
the European Hezbollah cells. The Hamadi family, apart from their strong 
relation since the group’s inception, was linked with the kidnappings of Eu-
ropean citizens   in Lebanon. 
 Kidnap of two West German businesspersons to pressure the West 
German government to free Mohammad Hamadi (Lebanon); 
 Kidnap of two Swiss mistaken for German and two Swedish journal-
ists (Lebanon, 1987). 
Levitt (2013) argues that following these actions, in 1992 one of Hezbollah’s 
missions was the assassination of Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi (Secretary Gen-
eral of Iranian Kurdish party PDKI). The operatives Rhayel and Farajollah 
Haider, allegedly organised by Fallahian (Iran Minister of Intelligence at the 
time) and headed by Abdolraham Banihashemi aka Abu Sharif, shot 
Sharafkandi in a Greek restaurant named “Mikonos” in Berlin, Germany.  
A Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 27 report stresses 
that in 1989 a Hezbollah network in Valencia, Spain was uncovered. This 
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(2012) Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization.  




cell was linked to a considerable stockpile of weapons in a vessel proveni-
ent from Lebanon via Cyprus.  
In addition, according to Levitt (2013) Aziz Nassour, after being accused of 
helping UNITA by the Angolan authorities, flew to Marbella in Spain. The 
authorities in Spain estimate that Nassour worked alongside Mohammed 
Derbah (possible Amal member). In 2001, Derbah and seventeen people, 
linked to Amal and Hezbollah, were detained due to their alleged involve-
ment in weapons trafficking beside the crimes of fraud, money laundering, 
extortion, counterfeit and a time-share scheme in the Canary Islands. This 
group/cell, according to the Spanish Baltasar Garzon, had a profit estimated 
on $10 million a year. 
Accused of money laundering Derbah was detained once again in 2003. 
Hezbollah, according to the same report abovementioned, attempted to 
strike through several attacks during the period of 2008/2012.  
 A bomb blasted an Israeli tourist bus in Burgas (2012) Bulgaria. The 
result of this attack was the death of the Bulgarian bus driver and five 
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Source: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2012) Hezbollah: 
Portrait of a Terrorist Organization, p.9) 
 
The European Union agreed to put Hezbollah military wing (26th of July of 
2013) in the European Union Directive CP 2001/93128, after the Burgas at-
tack.  
Overall, after analysing Hezbollah presence and activities in Europe it is 
safe to say that Portugal is not immune to a possible Hezbollah presence in 
its territory. Particularly if we consider the following reasons: 
 Hezbollah’s activities and/or substantial presence in Portuguese 
speaking countries; 
  Use of European countries as a launch pad for terrorist attacks (col-
lection of intelligence, logistic support, raising funds and so on); 
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 Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific 
measures to combat terrorism. Available online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32001E0931  




  Portugal is an entry point to Europe, for instance Lebanon is the fifth 
country with more conceded golden visas; 
 Levels of high corruption; 
  Its geographic location places Portugal as a potential strategic place 
to interconnect these countries29. 
2.5. Success 
The success of Hezbollah’s organisation can be summarised into some key 
factors: 
 The constant political vacuum present in Lebanon, the role of the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) viewed by some as pro-Hezbollah, 
plus, the Lebanese defence policy ‘motto’: “people, army and 
resistance”, offers legitimacy to Hezbollah’s vital role in national 
defence; 
 Strong financial  support from Iran and Syria plus, from their legal 
and illegal ‘businesses’; 
 Effective operational capabilities (national and transnational), as well 
as, a strong leadership and hierarchical organisation authority; 
 Solid discipline and valuable intelligence provided from their 
extensive network; 
  Religion validation for strategic changes, involvement on the 
Lebanese political system plus provision of a welfare system and the 
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 Please consult Hezbollah presence in Portuguese speaking countries, p. 117 
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struggle against Israel invasions gives the group legitimacy. 
2.6. Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities 
After the confirmation of Hezbollah’s presence in Syria (currently in a civil 
war for the fourth year) by a Hassan Nasrallah’s speech, a major setback 
followed in Lebanon. The movement started to lose followers/supporters, 
furthermore with the rising of various terrorist groups, particularly al-Nusra 
and the ‘Islamic State’ (Daesh), the movement began to appear decrepit. As 
a result, it is observable the recent efforts of Hezbollah’s Media Relations 
office to show that they are winning the war on terror by defending 
Lebanon’s borders from extremist groups, that their presence in Syria is 
fundamental.  
Levitt (2013) argues that Hezbollah sought to retaliate as a reaction of 
Mughniyeh’s homicide, nonetheless its capability of carry on international 
operations decreased with Mughniyeh’s death, recognised as a mastermind 
of terrorist attacks.   
However according to The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center (2003) one of the major weaknesses of Hezbollah is to manage a 
delicate balance between the core of the Lebanese arena where they act, 
and several constrictions imposed/influenced by Iran and Syria in key areas 





INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: PREVENTING AND COMBATING 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM – PORTUGAL INTERNAL SECURITY 
 
“Security is like oxygen: You do not tend to notice it until you begin to lose 
it.” 
Joseph S. Nye Jr. 
 
“Plans are nothing… Planning is everything.” 
Dwight D. Eisenhower 
 
3.1. Intelligence: Origin and cycle 
Throughout history, there are periodic references that mention the use of 
intelligence. Allegedly, soldiers during Ramses II rule in Egypt, were 
captured and subjected to torture with the intention of obtaining ‘valuable 
information’; Moses sent ‘spies’ before entering Canaan; the Chinese 
strategist Sun Tzu when he wrote the ‘Art of War’; Queen Elisabeth I 
sending Sir Francis Drake to collect ‘intelligence’ amid other references. 
But then again what is Intelligence? There are some definitions 
nevertheless, as terrorism there is no universal accepted definition. In a 
simple manner, intelligence can be a special form of knowledge necessary 
to accomplish a mission or the strategic knowledge that reveal opportunities/ 
threats that can endanger the mission success. 
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For instance, David Khan argues:  
“The roots of intelligence are biological. Every animal, even a 
protozoan, must have a mechanism to perceive stimuli, such as 
noxious chemicals, and to judge whether they are good or bad for it. 
At that level intelligence is like breathing: essential to survival, but not 
to dominance. To this primitive capacity for getting information from 
physical objects, humans have joined the ability to obtain it from 
words. This verbal ability has led to a form of intelligence far more 
powerful than the kind used by animals or men to hunt prey or flee 
predators. It has driven the rise of intelligence to its present 
significance.”  
Nonetheless, Khan currently considers intelligence divided into to two major 
segments: Physical and Verbal - “physical intelligence steadies command 
and verbal intelligence magnifies strength” (Gill, Marrin and Phytian, 2009, 
pp.4-8) 
For Michael Warner “Intelligence is secret state activity to understand or in-
fluence foreign entities.” (Warner, 2002, pp. 15–22) 
Moreover, Lowenthal’s definition of intelligence is: 
“Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information im-
portant to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and 
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provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguard-
ing of these processes and this information by counterintelligence ac-
tivities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful au-
thorities” (Lowenthal, 2002, p.8) 
Regarding multiple definitions, the one accepted more often is the definition 
provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):  
“Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and 
foreknowledge of the world around us - the prelude to decision and 
action by U.S. policymakers” (Waltz, 2003 pp.1-2). 
To talk about intelligence it is mandatory to mention Sherman Kent, known 
as the ‘father of intelligence analysis’, has he after the Second World War, 
defined intelligence in three different levels: 
1. Knowledge – Intelligence means knowledge, nonetheless it does not 
include all kinds of knowledge, it specifies that decision makers at a 
high rank will beneficiate from it to safeguard national stability  when 
faced with pretences of a foe state; 
2. Institutional – Functional structures with the mission of gathering 
data with the aim of producing a certain type of knowledge; 
3. Procedural – As a process, intelligence is the means and techniques   
employed to convert ‘raw data’ into intelligence. 
The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating 
transnational terrorism: The rising of the Party of God, Hezbollah 
58 
 
Kent sustains that intelligence is:  
“In the circumstances, it is surprising that there is not more general 
agreement and less confusion about the meaning of the basic terms. 
The main difficulty seems to lie in the word 'intelligence' itself, which 
has come to mean both what people in the trade do and what they 
come up with. To get this matter strait is crucial: intelligence is both a 
process and an end-product” (Kent, 1946, p.117)  
Moreover, Kent in order to provide a distinctive definition to the intelligence 
used as an operational concept when applied to analysis to support deci-
sion-making introduced the specific term ‘strategic intelligence’.  
To comprehend the work of the intelligence services it is crucial to know how 
the intelligence production, to take into account its cycle management, its 
phases:  
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The first phase of the cycle is where priorities, deadlines, means to be used 
and coordination are defined, considering the needs of the policymaker.  
Furthermore, the next phase, in order to obtain intelligence identified as 
necessary, is where the analyst obtains ‘raw data’ from several sources, for 
instance: 
• Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) - Collected from publicly 
available sources  
• Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) - Collected from  the interception of 
signals - Communications intelligence (COMINT) or electronic 
signals intelligence not directly used in communication (ELINT) 
• Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) - Collected from satellite/aerial 
photography 
• Human Intelligence (HUMINT) - Collected from interpersonal contact  
The third and the fourth phases of the cycle are designed to transform ‘raw 
data’/information into valuable intelligence, through registering, compilation, 
study and interpretation/analysis process along with its organisation by type 
generating conclusions and recommendations. 
The last phase of the conventional intelligence cycle is dissemination, based 
on a prompt submission of the intelligence product, to the 
decision/policymakers. 
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Although, there are some main critics on the intelligence cycle, for instance 
Johnston (2005) argues that the ‘conventional’ cycle omits elements, thereof 
it fails to capture the process correctly. In addition, it is more complex and 
difficult to spot when errors happen. Johnston (2005) also highlights that this 
cycle fails to explain how elements can affect the movement of the cycle, it 
transmits the idea of being continuously flowing and ‘fed’ by inputs.  Hence, 
Greg Treverton’s model is suggested as a more detailed and complete cycle 
since it considers the interactivity of the cycle phases.  






Source: Treverton Gregory F., (2003) Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information, 
Cambridge University Press, p.266. 
In addition, Johnston (2005) highlights Mark Lowenthal intelligence cycle, 
although simpler than Treverton’s, it also provides an insight on the 
revisions and reconsideration occur.  
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Source: Lowenthal Mark M., (2009), Intelligence from Secrets to Policy, Fourth Edition, CQ 
Quarterly, p.364 
Nonetheless, both models of the intelligence cycle fail to demonstrate 
efficiently who is accountable for what for instance. 
 Moreover, Johnston (2005) considers that the traditional cycle: 
 Does not accurately represent the impact of resource availability on 
analysts; 
 Does not represent the interactive nature of the process required for 
meeting objectives; 
 Assumes the process works the same way for all objectives, 
regardless of complexity and cognitive demand; 
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 Does not identify responsibilities for completing steps and allows for 
misconceptions in this regard. 
Hulnick (2006) also criticizes the conventional intelligence cycle, particularly 
because it fails to comprise two major integral components of intelligence 
work - counterintelligence and covert action. Moreover, on the first 
phase/stage, the intelligence consumers occasionally express their needs 
still they repeatedly rely that the intelligence system will provide what is 
necessary. It seems that policymakers need intelligence to support policy 
instead of being informed. Most of the times, guidance comes from within 
the system and the practitioners know its gaps and filling the gaps is what 
stimulates the intelligence gathering process. Therefore, the process that 
propels the collection phase of the cycle it is not guidance provided by the 
policymakers, it is the process of filling the gaps.  
The second phase should rely on filling the gaps during the process itself 
since, with all the sources available currently, particularly OSINT, the 
analysts should not wait for guidance from the policymakers.  As a result, 
intelligence managers are the genuine drivers of the collection process. 
Hulnick (2006) also highlights that a major concern of the cycle functioning 
is that occasionally intelligence collection and intelligence analysis are quite 
independent of each other and work as parallel, particularly because in 
practice there are constraints of information sharing (amidst other elements) 
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between intelligence collection and intelligence analysis. 
In the dissemination phase theoretically, the multiple products of the 
analysis are delivered to policymakers and as a result, policymakers based 
on these ought to make decisions or request additional intelligence inducing 
the cycle to restart. Nonetheless, Hulnick (2006) points out that this is a 
misrepresentation of what occurs in reality since it depends on the sort of 
intelligence product that is being supplied, considering that this product 
includes warning intelligence, the policymakers consider that it is implicit 
that the intelligence services know all so they should foresee every possible 
crisis that may take place. 
Considering the intelligence cycle process it is also important to clarify the 
difference between security intelligence and strategic intelligence purposes.  
3.1.1. Security Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence   
Informações de Segurança or Security intelligence is essential to prevent 
threats. Romana (2005) defines it as the study and evaluation of risks and 
the prevention of threats - internal or external source, as well as, State 
security, with asymmetrical characteristics (organised crime, terrorism, 
destabilisation of the pillars of the ‘Democratic State’).  
This type of intelligence serves the purpose of safeguarding internal security 
(homeland security) and the prevention of sabotage, terrorism, organised 
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crime, spying and other forms of destabilisation or destruction of the State.   
Security planning and national defence are based upon perceived threats 
and risks: 
Figure 13: Threat and Risk 
 
Strachan-Morris (2012) argues that the capability of a group can be 
‘measured’ by analysing their success rate of previous attacks, modus 
operandi, training, command logistical support and what is trying to obtain. 
In a practical sense, this can be measured following a threat assessment 








Threat Vulnerabilitiy Risk 
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Table 1: Threat Assessment Chart in Terrorism context example 
CAPIBILITY INTENT 
Sophisticated 
Capable of multiple 
coordinated complex attacks 
Extreme 
Specific intent + 
Freedom to attack 
 
High 
Capable of deliberate 
coordinated attacks 
High 
Demonstrates consistent intent 
+ create opportunity to attack 
Medium 
Capable of deliberate action 
Medium 
Display of intimidation and 
threats + 
Very limited opportunity to attack 
Low 
Capable of low level 
intimidation and extortion 
Low 
Display some aggression + no 
opportunity to attack 
Source: Strachan-Morris (2012, p.176 - Based upon a table compiled by Richard Siebert at Aegis 
Defence Services for use in Iraq. The definitions were a compilation of US and Australian military 
doctrine but the inclusion of ‘opportunity’ was Siebert’s own innovation) 
 
Informações Estratégicas políticas or political Strategic Intelligence is 
according to Romana (2005) divided in two main components: 
 DEFENSIVE* -  Produces intelligence with the purpose of : Identifying 
vulnerabilities; Prevent and neutralise threats against external 
interests of a State;  
 OFENSIVE - Produces intelligence with the purpose of : Creation of 
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strategies to maximize the projection of national interests in key areas 
(geopolitical, geo-cultural, geo-economics) 
*Counter-intelligence and active/passive measures are the key elements 
that support the defensive component.  
Furthermore, defensive strategic intelligence is essentially supported by the 
production of intelligence directed to identify vulnerabilities, to prevent or 
neutralise threats conducted by agents or entities against external interests 
either permanent or cyclical of a particular State. On the other hand, the 
offensive component of strategic intelligence relies on the production of 
intelligence to support strategies aimed to influence, determine and 
condition the geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-cultural framework of places, 
territories regarded as vital. 
Considering Strachan-Morris point abovementioned, plus Hezbollah 
capability as an organisation with a wide network, has a high level of 
opportunity since it can attack anywhere, like it did in previous attacks. 
Hence, bearing in mind this and the possibility of the group presence in 
Portugal we propose, as an exercise, a threat/vulnerability assessment 
considering a risk rating scale from five levels: 
1) Low – no threat indications/no forecast of threats to occur in the short 
term  
2)  Moderate – very limited indication of threats, unlikely to occur in the 
short term  
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3) Substantial – limited indication of threats to occur in the short term  
4)  Severe – clear indications of threats likely to occur  in the short term 
5) Critical – clear indications of imminent threats very likely to occur 
within a specific period of time 
 
 
Table 2: ‘Hezbollah in Portugal’ 

























4 2 4 5 15 
Attack on the critical 
infrastructures 




4 3 5 5 17 
Source:  Based upon a risk assessment table by Professor Heitor Barras Romana in a lecture of 
the Post-graduation in Intelligence and Security (ISCSP) 2011/12)  
In light of this exercise, it is very likely that Portugal is used as a launch pad 
for terrorist networks activities, particularly as a logistic support, money 
laundering/ fundraising schemes place. Hence, considering the possible 
presence of a terrorist group in the Portuguese territory we will proceed to 
the next topic. 
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3.2. Portugal’s place in the world 
Portugal was one of the propellers of globalisation during the Discoveries. 
Its rich history combined with the Portuguese diaspora placed Portugal in a 
unique position to project its national interests.  For instance, our sphere of 
influence with the Portuguese speaking countries, who are strategically 
important partners, followed by Portugal’s membership in the European 
Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation30, among other prestigious 
organisations.  
With prominent personalities in the international arena, such as António 
Guterres as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
or Jorge Sampaio, until recently,  as High Representative at the United 
Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) also José Barroso as President of 
the European Commission. Moreover, Portugal assumed the co-presidency 
of the 5+5 Dialogue 31  in 2013 and was non-permanent member of the 
Security Council (UNSC) during the biennium of 2011/2012. The sum of 
these factors, combined with others, may position the country to some risk. 
Though the Treaty of Westphalia still dominates the international relations 
panorama, the concept of sovereignty is changing, particularly if we observe 
how third parties influence the States. The positive factors of globalisation 
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 Portugal was one of its founders. 
31
 Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Malta + Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia 
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also expose Portugal to some dangers, and as observed on Chapter 2, the 
nature of threat has become transnational.  
 As a cooperative democracy, we rely on security cooperation mechanisms 
and although some security budgets are increasing, the tendency is to be 
less armed.  
More than ever, our intelligence services must be ready to answer 
successfully to these challenges. 
3.2.1. Country Profile 
Overview: One of the major concerns of the European Union security 
agenda is terrorism, particularly with the cases of European Jihadists/foreign 
fighters. According to the Portuguese Internal Security Annual Report (RASI) 
2014, the Portuguese Law Enforcement authorities are closely monitoring 
this phenomenon, as well as the identification of possible agents and modus 
operandi. For instance, Portuguese nationals/descendants moving to 
‘problematic’ countries or joining transnational terrorist groups as fighters, 
recruiters and other positions – the authorities confirmed the involvement of 
Portuguese nationals/descendants with the self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ 
(Daesh) Group. The authorities are also monitoring transnational organised 
crime and its expressions, for instance transatlantic drug trafficking, 
particularly the African Portuguese speaking countries. The Portuguese 
authorities verified that a there was a systematic abuse of the Dakar, Lisbon, 
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Brazil route by Sierra Leone nationals who later presented themselves as 
refugees in Portugal. 
RASI (2014) highlights that Portugal joined an international joint anti-
terrorism exercise, within the ATLAS Network frame, which carries out the 
most complex preparation and crises response through simultaneous 
terrorist attacks in Europe. 
The Portuguese Intelligence Services, according to the EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy, implemented close relation with the Islamic community 
along with the adoption of anti-radicalisation measures.  
Legislation, Law Enforcement and Border Security: The Portuguese 
government continued to use of counterterrorism key legislation:  
 Law n.º 52/2003, 22nd of August – Law to Combat Terrorism32  
 Law n.º 25/2008, 5th of June - Law to Combat Money Laundering and 
Financing Terrorism33. 
Portugal adopted the European Joint Declaration on Combating Terrorism in 
                                                     
32
 Available online at: 
http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=119&tabela=leis&ficha=1&pagina=1  
33
 Available online at: 
http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_estrutura.php?tabela=leis&artigo_id=991A0002&nid=991&
nversao=&tabela=leis&so_miolo 
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the beginning of 2015 (Riga, Latvia)34. The declaration aims to increase the 
exchange and sharing of intelligence through the improvement of the 
Schengen Intelligence System or for instance, specific consideration should 
be given to fight against financing of terrorism among other issues. 
Portugal implemented as well the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism35 
(2015) with the aim of adjusting existing legislation. The key pillars are of 
this Strategy are: 
 Detect – Early detection of potential terrorist threats, through the 
acquisition of essential knowledge for an efficient combat;   
 Prevent – Know and identify of the causes of radicalisation, 
recruitment and terrorist acts;  
 Protect – Reinforcement of security of key targets, reducing their 
vulnerability and the impact of possible terrorist threats; 
 Pursue – Dismantle or neutralise terrorist initiatives, as well as their 
logistic networks, hinder the movement of agents, communications, 
access to financing and material capable of being used in terrorist 
actions. Submit the agents involved in terrorist groups       
                                                     
34
 Available online at: 
https://eu2015.lv/images/Kalendars/IeM/2015_01_29_jointstatement_JHA.pdf  
35
 Available online at: http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/os-ministerios/ministerio-da-administracao-
interna/mantenha-se-atualizado/20150219-mai-mj-combate-terrorismo.aspx   
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 Response – Management of all operational means that will be used to 
in a possible terrorist action.     
The Strategy contemplates the promotion of a straight cooperation with 
multiple organisations/partners, for instance Eurojust, Europol and Frontex. 
In addition introduces eight draft laws: 
 Update of the definition of terrorism in Criminal Procedure Code; 
 Nationality Law –  Hinder the requirements for granting Portuguese 
nationality via naturalisation; 
 The law that establishes the legal regime of covert actions for 
prevention and criminal investigation; 
 The law that establishes measures to combat organised crime 
including economic/financial crime, able to cover all criminal 
offenses related to terrorism; 
 The Law to Combat Terrorism criminalising public incitement for the 
crime of terrorism and affiliation with terrorist groups; 
 The legal regime of entry, remain and leave  plus the removal of 
foreigners from national territory; 
 The organisation of the Law of Criminal Investigation to include all 
the criminal offences related to terrorism; 
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 The Law of Internal Security - Adding competencies to the Conselho 
Superior de Segurança Interna/Higher Council of Internal Security, 
besides reinforcing the organisation of the Anti-terrorism 
Coordination Unit (UCAT), which will be coordinated by the 
Secretary General of the Portuguese Republic Intelligence System 
(SIRP). 
Countering the Financial Terrorism: Portugal is a member of the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) since 1991 as well as the Committee of Experts 
on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and Financing of 
Terrorism (MONEYVAL) and observer of the Eastern and Southern Africa 
Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD) and Inter Governmental 
Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), all of which 
are FATF-style regional bodies. Portugal is also member of the Egmont 
Group36 through the Unidade de Informação Financeira (UIF) established by 
the Portuguese Law to Combat Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism 
n.º 25/2008, of 5th of June37. 
Regional and International Cooperation: Portugal is a founding member 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and takes part in several 
                                                     
36
 Global association of Financial Intelligence Units 
37
 Available online at: 
http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_estrutura.php?tabela=leis&artigo_id=991A0002&nid=991&
nversao=&tabela=leis&so_miolo   
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missions such “Operation Active Endeavour” (Mediterranean), “Operation 
Inherent Resolve” (Iraq) besides continuing to participate in several 
multilateral initiatives to counterterrorism. Portuguese cooperation with 
regional and international organisations on counterterrorism includes the 
European Union, OECD, OSCE, 5+5 Dialogue, European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), Europol, Interpol, United Nations.  
Portugal, according to a report from OSCE (2015), signed fourteenth of the 
nineteenth Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols, as well as 
eleventh of the sixteenth international and regional legal instruments related 
to terrorism or co-operation in criminal matters38. 
3.3. Historic evolution of Intelligence in Portugal  
 According to the Portuguese Intelligence Security Service (SIS) 39  the 
production of intelligence was, for centuries, developed by informal relations 
between monarchs and their most reliable officers. In addition, during the 
inception of the Portuguese Nation, it was linked to key areas of the 
government, such as the territorial conquer process and the kingdom´s 
political unification. 
Its evolution is marked by some key events before the Carnation Revolution 
on the 25th of April 1974, which ended the established dictatorial political 
                                                     
38
 Available online at: http://www.osce.org/atu/17138?download=true  
39
 Serviço de Informações de Segurança (SIS) official webstite: http://www.sis.pt  
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regime Estado Novo: 
Figure 14: Evolution of intelligence in Portugal until 1974 
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Subsequently with the overthrown of the regime, the national intelligence 
system was dismissed. During 1974, the creation of the Executive law 
400/74 of 29th of August was in part an answer/solution to fill the intelligence 
void, establishing that the coordination of these matters would pass through 
the 2nd Division of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (EMGFA). 
During this troubled times there were multiple attempts to establish intelli-
gence services or at least to manage intelligence. Some of these attempts 
were:  
 Intelligence Management and Coordination Department (SDCI) - Es-
tablished by the Executive law 250/75 of 23rd of May; 
 SDCI was dismissed - Task of producing intelligence given to the In-
telligence Division of the Armed Forces (DINFO); 
 DINFO was in charge of producing intelligence until 1984 - Legal 
competence to exclusively produce military intelligence; 
 In 1977 General (at time Brigadier) Pedro Cardoso proposed the 
creation of the Intelligence System of the Republic (SIR) – It was not  
developed; 
 With the purpose of organising a national intelligence system, the Law 
n.º 30/84 of 5th of September established the Intelligence System of 
the Portuguese Republic (SIRP).   
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The Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic (SIRP) established in 
1984, although passing through several adjustments, is currently in force 
with the aim of intelligence production necessary to safeguard national in-
dependence and national interests, the unity and integrity of the State along 
with internal and external security regarding the tasks and powers of the 
services mentioned according to the law. 
 3.4. Portuguese Intelligence Services 
Presently, the Portuguese intelligence panorama is constituted by the 
Portuguese Republic Intelligence System (SIRP), which integrates two 
autonomous intelligence services with independent capabilities both 
coordinated by the key figure of the Secretary General.   
According to SIRP40, the Sistema de Informações da República Portuguesa 
or the Portuguese Republic Intelligence System (SIRP) it was established in 
1984 as above mentioned, envisioning three intelligence services: Defence 
and Strategic Intelligence Service  (SIED), Military Intelligence Services 
(SIM) and Security Intelligence Service (SIS). The regulations of these three 
services were established by the Decree Laws n.º 224/85 for SIED, n.º 
225/85 for SIS and n.º 226/85 for SIM nevertheless, SIS was the only 
service to operate during the 1980s. 
It is essential to highlight that the article 31º, from Law n.º 30/84 of 5th of 
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 Available online at: www.sirp.pt  
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September, precluded former agents of the PIDE-DGS services as well as 
the Portuguese Legion members or informants of both institutions. 
After multiple adjustments the introduction of the Law n.º 4/95 of 21st of 
February brought considerable changes to the Portuguese intelligence 
services. The SIM was extinct nonetheless, the military component was 
integrated into SIED became Military, Defence and Strategic Intelligence 
Service (SIEDM). The SIEDM was legislated by the regulatory decree n.º 
254/95.  
In 2004, SIEDM capabilities were adjusted along with as SIRP’s Organic by 
the Law n.º 4/2004 of 6th of November. The major adjustment on SIEDM 
was the loss of its military component and as a consequence the military 
intelligence was attributed to the Armed Forces. With these adjustment 
processes SIRP is now headed and coordinated by its Secretary General 
reporting directly to the Prime Minister.  
The Law n.º 9/2007 of 19th of February, established the structure of the 
Secretary General of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic, 
the Strategic Defence Intelligence Service (SIED) and the Security 
Intelligence Service (SIS) revoking Laws n.º 225/85 of 4th of July and n.º 
254/95 of 30th of September. Moreover, the article 17º introduced joint 
structures for the intelligence services within SIRP: 
 Human Resources Department; 
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 General support and Finances Department; 
 Information Technologies Department; 
 Security Department 
In 2014, the establishment of the organic law n.º 4/2014 of 13th of August41 
amends, for the fifth time, and republished  the organic law n.º 30/84 of 5th 
of September, along with the Law n.º 9/2007 of 19th of February and revokes 
the decree-laws n.º 225/85 of 4th of July and n.º 254/95 of 30th of 
September. 
Figure 15: SIRP Organisational Chart
 
Source: SIED (Available online at: www.sied.pt)  
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 Available online at: https://dre.pt/application/dir/pdf1sdip/2014/08/15500/0419404206.pdf  
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As established by the laws aforementioned, SIRP structure can be a 
complex system where all bodies, represented in the above chart, perform 
diverse nonetheless complementary tasks: 
 Election of the members of the Conselho de Fiscalização dos 
Serviços de Informações/Supervisory Council of the Intelligence 
Services by the Assembleia da República/Parliament of the 
Portuguese Republic; 
 The Parliament of the Portuguese Republic is also responsible to 
hear, in a parliamentary committee, the nominee for the Secretary 
General position; 
 The Prime Minister: coordinates the activity of the services, chairs  the 
Conselho Superior de Informações/ Intelligence Supreme Council as 
well as inform the President (the PM actions are assisted by the 
Intelligence Supreme Council ). Has the power to appoint/exonerate 
the Secretary General of SIRP, as well as the both directors of the 
intelligence services; 
 The Secretary General reports directly to the Prime Minister and it has 
a status similar to Secretary of State. The duties are established in 
the article 19.º of the republished law n.º30/84 of 5th of September, it 
has a support office with the same legal regime as ministerial offices;  
 The Intelligence Supreme Council is supported by a technical 
committee; 
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 The technical committee is directed by the SIRP Secretary General as 
well as the General Secretaries of both services;  
 The members of the Comissão de Fiscalização dos Centros de 
Dados/Data Monitoring or Supervision Committee are selected by the 
Procurador Geral da República Portuguesa/Attorney General of the 
Portuguese Republic; 
SIS is within SIRP’s scope by law (paragraph 2, article 25º, Law n.º 
53/2008) the only service that is responsible, along with the law 
enforcement authorities, to exercise internal security functions. Its mission 
is, above all through a preventative approach, anticipate multiple threats 
and inform the policymakers on time. This requires essentially the use of the 
intelligence cycle, to gather information and to product intelligence to: 
• Safeguard internal security; 
• Prevent acts of espionage, sabotage and terrorism; 
• Prevent acts that may, because of their nature, alter or destroy the 
rule of law. 
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Figure 16: SIS work sources 
 









It has the duty of:  
 
For those duties to be accomplished SIS relies on:  
o  Production: of intelligence on the development of terrorist threats 
aimed to identify, in advance, threats that maybe hanging over the 
safety of the citizens; Threat assessment that contribute to reduce 
vulnerabilities, consequently reducing risks in the event of a terrorist 
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SIS 
• OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) Data collected from open 
sources and unclassified documents available to the public in 
general;  
• HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Gathering intelligence through 
human sources;  
• Access to data and information contained in files through 
established protocols with the public authorities 
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attack, particularly against critical infrastructures as well as less 
protected targets; procedures of terrorist groups on gathering 
intelligence, selection of targets and on technical equipment, in order 
to adopt measures to decrease vulnerabilities; Reviews of threat 
assessments to prevent further attacks in the period after the attack. 
o Identification: on time, of the causes and sources that may foster 
violent radicalisation, recruitment for terrorist groups/actions; Agents 
and modus operandi used in violent radicalisation/recruitment 
activities ; Exploitation of the internet with the purpose of incitement to 
violence, recruitment and terrorist training. 
o Detection: of signs of planning/preparing terrorist attacks against 
national or international targets in national territory; Evidence, 
promptly, of the formation of local terrorist cells and/or presence of 
elements belonging to terrorist groups in national territory; Individuals 
and organisations that provide logistical support and/or financing 
terrorism; Activities that comprise the use of national territory as a 
place of acquisition of materials to produce weapons of mass 
destruction; 
o Cooperation: with other countries intelligence services, in order to 
identify possible connections of terrorist networks in Portugal. 
Overall, ensure the coordination of response in the event of an attack. 
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It has also the duty of cooperating with SIED according to SIRP’s Secretary 
General indications, along with communicating with the law enforcement 
authorities for criminal investigations or/and with the purpose of prosecution, 
regarding state secret. 
Concerning international relations/cooperation SIS is, according to n. º2 and 
3º, article 11. º of Law n.º 9/2007 of 19th of February, allowed to cooperate 
with other intelligence services in all areas of their activities, in line with the 
priorities of foreign policy beside the guidelines established by SIRP’s 
General Secretary. 
Cooperation is a vital structure for SIS in the fight against threats particularly 
in the prevention and combat of international terrorism. 
For an effective cooperation SIS policy relies into two objectives:  









via exchange of intelligence 
on the phenomena that may 
affect the security of the 
countries that maintain 




on phenomena capable of 
turning into threats to the 
internal and national security 
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Apart from preventing and combating terrorism, in the light of this 
dissertation, it is important to mention the role of SIS regarding organised 
crime. One of SIS key purposes is to make Portugal a hostile territory to the 
presence and action of organised crime, particularly because of its nature 
and capability to undermine the financial and economic system (public or 
private). Considering that, plus the ability to infiltrate and undermine or 
disrupt state structures, these networks must be tackled in advance by the 
intelligence services. 
Thereof, the intelligence services establish patterns through the analysis of 
these groups’ origins, evolution and adaptation capabilities, are capable to 
outline stronger and effective strategies to tackle it. Moreover, SIS is 
committed to the production of intelligence to identify trends/patterns in the 
activities of criminal structures, diverse typologies, working mechanisms, 
including the level of hierarchies, as well as behavioural actions of its 
members, geographic areas of operation plus routes for their strategic 
activities (drug, arms, human trafficking, money laundering, facilitation of 
illegal immigration, amidst other activities) 
Predominantly SIS’s core work is to product intelligence. Therefore, it is the 
law enforcement authorities, within the spectre of criminal investigation, who 
as the role of repressing organised crime structures/networks. 
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Regarding Law framework, apart from Law n.º 9/2007 of 19th of February, 
SIS security biding general rules are: 
 SEGNAC 42  – 1) Addresses the rules of classified material; 2) 
Industrial security; 3) Communications Security;4) Computer security 
[SIS follows the doctrine expressed in these rules. The National 
Security Office (ANS) role related with SIS is to provide training in this 
area, as well as to monitor if these rules are followed]. 
 Internal Security Law (LSI) n.º 53/2008 of 29th of August and State 
Secret Law n.º 6/94 of 7th of April.  
A myriad of laws to does not allow this SIS to: 






The Defence and Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED), according to the law 
n.º 4/2004 of 6th of November, it is the responsible entity to product 
intelligence to safeguard national independence and national interests, 
along with the external security of the Portuguese State.  
                                                     
42
 Available online at: http://www.cfsirp.pt/Geral/segnac.html  
 Intercept communications (Constitution article 34º, n.º4); 
 Detain people (Law n.º 5/95 + article 250º Code of Criminal 
Procedure); 
 Restrict rights, freedoms and guarantees; 
 Launch investigations or criminal proceedings; 
 Law enforcement authorities or court competencies 
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This service contributes to the policy making process through the production 
of intelligence, particularly focused on: 
• Assessment of terrorist threats + identification of organised crime 
networks, particularly  those involved in drug trafficking, facilitation of 
illegal immigration, nuclear/biological/chemical proliferation;  
• Early alert to situations where there is a potential compromise of 
national interests; 
• Political, energy, economic  and defence matters that are a priority to 
Portuguese foreign policy. 
To achieve results SIED follows the intelligence cycle – planning, 
research/collection, processing, analysis/interpretation and dissemination, 
regarding the rights and freedoms established in the Portuguese 
Constitution, along with guidelines issued by the Prime Minister (via SIRP 
Secretary General). 
It is with a complex evolutionary matrix, the symbiosis between terrorism 
and organised crime groups, both asymmetrical threats and diffuse 
scenario, that the intelligence services within SIRP have to deal, thereof it is 
susceptible to constant reframing’s. 
 
 
The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating 
transnational terrorism: The rising of the Party of God, Hezbollah 
88 
 
3.4.1. Portuguese Intelligence Services and Integrated Internal Security 
System 
The establishment of the Law of Internal Security (LSI) n.º 53/2008 of 29th of 
August, regarding its third chapter article n.º 12 by including SIRP Secretary 
General into the Integrated Internal Security System (SISI) Council, reveals 
the effort to establish a solid cooperation between both systems. 
According to the articles 15.º to 19.º,  SISI Secretary General is central in 
the LSI, although  with similar competencies to SIRP Secretary General the 
SISI Secretary General has a broader spectre of duties. Nonetheless, it 
should be highlighted that the SISI Secretary General competencies are  
performed according with the coordination, control and operational plan of 
the law enforcement authorities, which is approved by the  Council of 
Ministers on a basis of a proposal from the Prime Minister. 
Overall, as an effort to improve coordination of the law enforcement 
authorities, the bases to create the Integrated Internal Security System were 
established. Regarding this, complementarity is one of the key points of 
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3.5. Future of Intelligence: Challenges and dilemmas  
An intricate interaction between many actors dominates and contributes the 
present fast shifting global environment. Those shifts present the 
intelligence community with a potential for surprise and surprises are the 
first thing that the intelligence services want to avoid, the paradigm of 
intelligence and intelligence analysis changed, driven first and foremost by 
the shift in targets from the predominance of nation-states to transnational 
groups. Thereof the intelligence community must be agile, anticipatory, 
preventive, and above all learn to adapt to this fast shifting world. 
According to Waltz (2003) there are two main sources of future threats to 
national and international security. The first one is the complex and diverse 
range of actor’s interaction and the second is “the threat-generating 
mechanism because of rational nation-state behaviors to discontinuities in 
complex world affairs.”(Waltz,2003,p.49) 
According to an U.S. intelligence officer since 9/11 there are three critical 
areas that need to adapt: 
1. Global intelligence cooperation. National intelligence organizations 
must collaborate and include academic- and business-sector 
contributors to provide true in-depth global background intelligence. 
2. Open-source intelligence. Organizations must “move beyond” the 
primary focus on secret sources and methods and develop means to 
embrace and integrate open sources into analysis. 
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3. New analysis. Analytic communities must create new cultures of 
collaboration and “reflection” that will enable them to understand 
nonstate threats. (Waltz, 2003, p.49) 
Waltz (2003) also points to the fact that the conventional characteristics of 
intelligence were centralised, for instance:  
 focus on collection and secret sources; known and continuous, 
predictable targets; hierarchical analysis organisation and control; 
intelligence management on tactical, operational, measurable 
objectives; focus on intelligence as a product  
Need to be reviewed and maybe substituted by a distributive approach with 
the follow characteristics: 
 Focus on analysis, collaboration with others, open and closed 
sources; targets are unknown, discontinuous, and unpredictable; 
networked analysis organisation and collaboration; intelligence 
management on strategic, anticipatory, adaptive objectives; focus on 
intelligence as a service. 
Schreier (2005) argues that the key challenges and problems for 
intelligence are present within the: 
 Human and signals intelligence collection, analysis, cooperation with 
law enforcement agencies, plus sharing of intelligence;  
 Real-time intelligence needs to reach promptly those who can most 
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effectively counter terrorism or other threats. 
Alternatively, Agrell (2012) suggests that the major concerns that the 
intelligence community is presented with are:  
 The decreasing hegemony of national intelligence; 
 The rise of new fields of knowledge with intelligence relevance; 
 The diminishing relative importance of exclusive sources and 
methods;  
 The rise of new actors producing and providing intelligence; 
  The loss of an intellectual monopoly in a competitive knowledge 
environment;  
 Increasing demand for reliable assessments and verification in a 
fragmented world of information.  
Moore (2003) highlights that the intelligence errors and failures are:  
 Intelligence professionals cannot afford to consider only information 
that conforms to their own pre-existing worldview or agreed upon, 
collective perspective; 
 Understand the differences between “intelligence error” and 
“intelligence failure”; 
 “Failure of imagination” - members of an intelligence fail to imagine 
in advance the essential outlines of an incident that subsequently 
occurs; 
 Policy Failures - failure to act on intelligence received; 
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  To make sure policy “understands it” - the message is not effectively 
transmitted and acted upon. 
For an effective approach above all, the intelligence community should take 
into account the facts aforementioned and the lessons learned to combat 
terrorism according to Schmid (2011): 













 Categorising terrorism by groups with similar characteristics in 
phases, waves, periods allow us to place and understand their 
ideology/tactics, to establish patterns. Hence, in one hand the groups 
become more predictable and easy to deter, on the other hand this 
approach may contain some gaps, particularly allowing smaller or low 
key groups that don’t ‘fit the profile’ to rise without being noticed. It is 
crucial to interpret the society behaviour with special attention when a 
shift of power happens.     
 The analysis of prevention and combat of transnational terrorism 
presented us with several dilemmas and challenges. The first one, 
apart from plenty of attempts, is no general accepted definition of 
terrorism, which may have some impact on international cooperation, 
on the application of judicial measures and even on research. Though 
challenging this should not be an impediment to tackle it. Secondly, 
terrorism nature is intricate and not static, it is constantly shifting plus 
its secrecy ‘divert’ researchers of doing their research efficiently – 
access to files, interviewing terrorists (danger of being too empathetic 
or unjust), dubious sources… 
 We need to improve the matrix of intelligence analysis. Our services 
have to be sharp, focused and one-step ahead to forecast real threats 




contribution of Sherman Kent and other prestigious academics, it is 
utterly required the creation of a new genuine bridge between 
practitioners and scholars. Such as academics dedicated to 
international relations, intelligence, law and security studies [although 
happening in Portugal, for example with the work of the Observatory 
of Security, Organised Crime and Terrorism (OSCOT) and the 
Portuguese National Defence Institute (IDN), it is still a scarce 
number]. It would be a win-win symbiosis, since the academia could 
do orientated research by identifying the demands of the intelligence 
analysis practitioners, creating a strong methodology with appropriate 
theoretical foundations. Consequently, the scholars would beneficiate 
from the practitioner’s knowledge and experience, mostly from 
situations of failure (what to do next time; what to improve; creation of 
new methods…). Part of this cooperation would pass naturally 
through a rigorous background assessment of the people involved.  
 Adding the Autoridade Tributária to the Anti-terrorism Coordination 
Unit (UCAT) may perhaps beneficiate the system, specifically to 
tackle the alliance between organised crime and terrorism, focusing 
for example on logistic support and money laundering schemes.  
Portugal, like other countries it is not immune to suffer from a terrorist 
attack and from our point of view, at the moment, it is more likely to be 




attacks, money laundering, safe haven or even fundraising  (this one 
in particular perhaps not directly). The analyses of the second chapter 
displayed the group capability to manage elaborate schemes. Hence, 
it is imperative to dismantle their logistic and financial support, as it is 
a way of neutralising or at least weaken the group position. This could 
be a vital ‘piece of the puzzle’ on preventing and combating terrorism 
on Portuguese soil. 
 Analysing the intricate working mechanisms of Intelligence Services it 
is not an easy task in part because of its nature as aforementioned. 
The Portuguese Intelligence Services, in particular, still suffer from the 
heavy shadow left by the PIDE from the Estado Novo dictatorship. In 
addition, the recent scandals associated with people previously 
connected to the services do not help. Yet we can observe the 
growing interest of the academia and the effort of the IDN to promote 
this subject, to clear the wrong image left by the past.  Nonetheless, 
there is a lot of work to do. 
  Apart from the efforts, it is still a taboo to talk and study this topic in 
the Portuguese society, although understandable. A ‘makeover’ of the 
services as to be done, with the aim of making it more transparent 
(respecting its nature evidently) and clarify some persistent myths. 
For instance, people commonly have the misconception that the 




detain and so on. However, by law the Autoridade Tributária currently 
as far more power to investigate and detain a suspect than the 
Intelligence Services. An agent from the Intelligence Services cannot 
detain a suspect it is required to call law enforcement authorities. 
Although, confronted with an imminent threat, the agent as the same 
‘power’ as a civilian if he/she observes a situation of looming danger, 
it has the power to detain the suspect and hand him/her to the law 
enforcement authorities afterwards. 
 In the United Kingdom, generally speaking, most of the society have a 
clear perception of the Intelligence Services work, by that we do not 
mean their mechanisms but the purpose of their existence. In 
Portugal now, the society is distant and alienated because, a part 
from other things, the lack of knowledge leads to distrust and 
suspicion. The best way to earn that trust and respect it is to show the 
purpose of their existence, to inform, to display that their work is 
fundamental, the first line of defence to keep the population safe in an 
opaque perilous world where threats can come from anywhere. To be 
more effective and accountable we must engage civil society into this 
subject by improving public perception, public resilience and self-
awareness of identifying possible dangerous situations, stress that 
civil society has a role to play. 




directly preventing terrorism, since there is a risk of creating a 
‘paranoid’ society unintentionally. This should pass by engaging the 
community on wider safety and security matters. For instance the law 
enforcement authorities should establish a relation of trust with 
reliable social organisations/authorities, who are directly involved with 
its citizens, to create a pattern if there are changes to normal 
situations. Henceforth, planning and preparation that guarantee an 
effective co-ordination between all the services involved is 
strategically crucial.  
 By developing a strong and effective working relation between the 
intelligence services and the security authorities internally, we are 
more able to do it externally, particularly using Portugal’s geostrategic 
position and sphere of influence. To tackle threats on time we must do 
the effort of, not only share, but also be efficient on complementing 
our intelligence with valuable research and analyses from our 
international counterparts. Information can be ambiguous and now, 
the volume of information that the intelligence services need to 
process is enormous. As a result, the prioritisation of tactical analysis 
(organisational charts, connections, modus operandi - in particular 
logistic support, money laundering and fundraising schemes) is 
essential to inform well the politicians so they can take better-




depends upon political will and tenacity to drive an operation forward.  
 It is essential to have high quality, focused personnel that are able to 
produce high quality reports/analysis for an on time intervention and 
capable of establishing patterns. However, it is important to, once 
again, ‘read’ the society, to spot the origin of the problem by analysing 
demography, marginalisation, lack of opportunities, captivating 
ideological outbursts.  At this level a possible structure to prevent and 
combat terrorism should comprise first tactical analysis 
complemented by an operative team, both ‘teams’ should have an 
open communication and be backed with a strong symbiotic, well-
defined strategy.  
 Through the analyses of the second chapter, we observed the group 
resilience, creativity, capacity of reinventing themselves especially 
facing lack of funds. Indeed, the intelligence services cannot use their 
methods. Nonetheless, it should acquire their spirit of reinventing 
themselves with a new approach by investing in a diverse group of 
intelligence analysts/officers in terms of age, social background and 
gender-balance. It is difficult to predict these kinds of group’s actions, 
principally if we fail to think differently, fail to exclude all the 
possibilities, as terrorism is a dynamic, changing phenomenon the 
intelligence services also should be.  




the necessary tools to prevent and combat terrorist groups in theory. 
Although, the fact that they do not have the ability to intercept 
communications or to detain suspects (two controversial matters), 
plus possible high budget cuts, may affect their actions, to fulfil its 
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The Organizational structure of Hezbollah  






The Chain of Command for External Terrorist Attacks 












• Hezbollah leader 
Mustafa Badr al-Din 
• Head of External 
Operations Networks 
Talal Hamiya 
• Head of Overseas 
Operations Unit 
Terrorist Operatives in 






      
 Name: Hezbollah (Party of God) also 
spelled Hizbollah or Hezbullah. Hezbollah 
has also used the names Revolutionary 
Justice Organisation and Organisation for 
the Oppressed Earth, Islamic Jihad and 
the Islamic Resistance for some opera-
tions  
 Founded: Early 1980s 
 
 Home base: Lebanon. The group also has cells in the North/South 
America, Asia, Africa and Europe 
 
 Backing: Iran and Syria provide generous organisational, training and 
financial support  
 
 Objectives: Defined in the “Open Letter” (16/02/1985). Primarily Jihad 
against the oppressors (particularly US and Israel), instauration of a Shia 
Islamic Government in the image of the Islamic Republic of Iran (this objec-
tive was perhaps abandoned) 
 
 Organisation: Please consult the organisational charts aforementioned 
 
 Political activity: Joined the Lebanese political scene in 1992. It is an 
integral and accepted Lebanese political element, although unlike other 
groups, they have not renounced violence as a political instrument. The 
group also provide social welfare services in South Lebanon. 






‘Who’s Who’ - Hezbollah Top Figures 
 (According to Norton, Hamzeh and other sources) 
 
 
Name: Ruhollah Moosavi Khomeini 
Born: 24 September 1902, Khomeyn, Persia – Died:  3            
June 1989, Tehran, Iran 
Role: ‘Father’ of the Islamic Revolution; Iranian Supreme 
Leader 
 
Name: Hassan Nasrallah 
Born: 31 August 1960, Bourj hammoud, Lebanon. 
Role: Secretary General 
 
Name: Imad Mugniyah 
Born: 7 December 1962, Tayr Dibba, Lebanon – Died: 12 
February 2008, Damascus, Syria.  
Role: Head of Jihad Council 
 
Name: Sheik Mohammad Hussein Fadl-Allah 
Born: 16 November 1935, Najaf, Iraq – Died 4 July 2010 
Role: Hezbollah’s Spiritual Leader 
 
Name: Sheik Naim Qassem 
Born: 1953, Kfar Fila, Lebanon 
Role: Deputy Secretary-General  
 
Name: Hajj Husein Halil 
Born: ? 
Role: Head of Political Advisor  
 
Name: Hashem Safi al-Din 
Born: ? 







Name: Sheik Muhammad Yazbek  
Born: ? 
Role: Head of Judiciary Council 
 
Name: Abbas al-Mussawi 
Born: 1952, Al-Nabi Shayth (bekaa valley), Lebanon – Died: 
16 February 1992, Nabatieh, Lebanon 
Role: Co-founder and the first Secretary General of Hezbol-
lah 
 
Name: Subhi al-Tufayli 
Born: ? 
Role: Former Secretary General 
 
Name: Mustapha Badreddine/Badr al-Din aka “Saab” 
Born: 6 April 1961 
Role: Head of Hezbollah´s operational networks  
(Mughniyeg cousin/brother-in-law) 
 
Name: Muhammad Baquir al-Sadr 
Born: 1 March 1935, al-Kazimiya, Iraq – Died: 9 April 1980, 
Baghdad 
Role: Prestigious Ayatollah  
 
Name: Ibrahim Amin al-Sid 
Born: ? 
Role: Head of Political Council 
 
Name: Musa al-Sadr 
Born: 4 June 1928, Kom, Iran – Disappeared: 31 August 
1979, Lybia 







Hezbollah activities in Europe 




































Hezbollah presence in Portuguese speaking countries 













          









                     Hezbollah presence in Portuguese speaking countries 
                     Portuguese speaking countries with a close relation to Portugal  
                     Portugal Lebanon relation 
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